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ABSTRACT 
IDEOLOGICAL ENDZONES: NFL FILMS AND THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE 
TRADITION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
 
MAY 2010 
 
NICHOLAS R. ARCHER, B.A., KEENE STATE COLLEGE 
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Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Dean E. Robinson 
 
 
This study examines the role of propaganda and popular culture in constituting the 
American political tradition through the study of NFL films by employing a decidedly 
overlooked theoretical conception of the American political tradition—the 
countersubversive tradition thesis. Originally put forth by Michael Rogin, the 
countersubversive tradition is defined as “the creation of monsters as a continuing feature 
of American politics by the inflation, stigmatization, and dehumanization of political 
foes.” It is my belief that in looking at what constitutes the individual characteristics of 
the countersubversive tradition in a text like a sports film it is easier to see how it fits into 
similar theories offered by political scientists and others about the intersections of pop 
culture, sport, propaganda, and political tradition. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
MASS TEXTS, THE NFL, AND THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE TRADITION IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 
“The NFL is America’s passion; pure and simple…the grip of an NFL team on its fans 
and community is special. It brings families and communities together in a unique way.” 
- “This is the NFL 2008-09”1  
 
“The public must be reduced to passivity in the political realm, but for submissiveness to 
become a reliable trait, it must be entrenched in the realm of belief as well.” 
- Noam Chomsky2 
  
After stunning the heavily-favored St. Louis Rams in Super Bowl XXXVI in 
2002 (the first Super Bowl held after 9/11), New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft 
said “We are all Patriots, and tonight the Patriots are world champions.” Commentary on 
the NFL Films-produced documentary of the victory said “like their country, they were 
brothers in arms—proud to be called Patriots.”3 Both Kraft’s comments and the NFL’s 
own commentary equated the victory of a sports franchise with a collective national 
identity at a particularly nationalistic moment in American history. The victory of a 
sports brotherhood became symbolic of an armed national brotherhood, defying odds 
after a psychologically damaging national tragedy and marching to war against an enemy 
that had penetrated American shores. 
It would perhaps be easy to see the not-so-latent evocations of patriotism and 
national armed unity as entertainment merely imitating politics—a calculating owner and 
                                                 
1
 “This is the NFL 2008-2009” National Football League (2008). 
2
 Noam Chomsky, “Containing the Threat of Democracy,” (paper presented at the Glasgow Conference on 
Self-Determination and Power: Life Task, Political Task, January 1990). 
3Patriots: Superbowl XXXVI Champions, directed by Dave Petreilius (New York, NY: NFL Films/USA 
Home Entertainment, 2002). 
 
 2 
league merely responding to a national event in a way that would help their product grow 
by capitalizing on existing political sentiment. In this study, I turn the causality arrow in 
the other direction. Rather than seeing mass entertainment as ancillary to questions of 
political belief, I argue that both today and historically, mass entertainment, in this 
particular case professional football filmography, is a central yet overlooked constitutive 
element which produces and defines the boundaries of permissible political discourse and 
subsequently a significant part of the political tradition in America—a tradition whose 
meaning has been disputed rigorously in American politics. 
The Question of the American Political Tradition in Scholarship 
 Commenting on the persisting power of Louis Hartz’ The Liberal Tradition in 
America nearly 50 years after it was published, James Morone noted that contemporary 
Political Science generally and American political tradition scholarship specifically 
seems to be stuck in a “Hartzian amber” of liberalism which argues the American 
political tradition in terms of a few narrow concepts: commitment to equality, rights, 
limited government and economic markets, while simultaneously ignoring the importance 
of popular culture in the shaping of American political belief.4 The hue of the Hartzian 
amber is evident in Seymour Martin Lipset’s description of America as the “most 
religious, optimistic, patriotic, rights-oriented, and individualistic” nation in the world.5  
Of course, scholars of the liberal tradition were and are not necessarily fetishists of 
liberalism as such—Lipset argues that the valuation of liberal individualism is directly 
                                                 
4
 James Morone, “Storybook Truths about America,” Studies in American Political Development  19, Fall 
2005: 225. 
5Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1995), 26. 
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responsible for everything from high crime rates to teen pregnancy6—and as Morone has 
pointed out, Hartz, wrote his book as a polemic against what he saw as an “irrational 
obsession with market capitalism that, at times, subverted private rights and personal 
liberty.”7 Still, whatever problems they may see with unbridled liberalism, liberal 
tradition scholars are quick to point out the futility of trying to suggest alternatives to it, 
in part arguing that to do so is antithetical to a democratic culture since individuals need 
to keep their ideological engagements to make sense of social existence even as the world 
around them changes.8 
 Nonetheless, challenges to the liberal tradition thesis have sprung up periodically. 
Of these, perhaps the most noteworthy has been Rogers Smith’s multiple traditions thesis. 
In his criticism of American political tradition scholarship, Smith notes that even scholars 
critical of the liberal tradition, be they advocates of “synthetic republicanism” such as 
James Pocock and Bernard Bailyn or “Protestantism” such as John Diggins all concede 
that their own conceptions of the political tradition are welded to liberalism in some 
shape or form. Hence, as Smith notes, while these debates represent interesting work 
within political tradition scholarship, they are not challenging the idea that American 
political culture is fundamentally or most enduringly liberal.9 
 Smith’s own contribution, the multiple traditions thesis, argues that attachments to 
liberalism and republicanism must also be seen in light of a third tradition of 
                                                 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Morone, 220. 
8
 Lipset, 276. 
9
 Rogers Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz: Multiple Traditions in America,” The American 
Political Science Review 87, no.3 (Fall 2003): 549. 
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ascriptivism—the attachment of characteristics to certain groups largely on the basis of 
race, which promotes decidedly illiberal ideologies that have defined the political status 
of minorities and women through most of American history. In his work Smith primarily 
focuses on the intellectual codification of ascriptive ideology and its dissemination 
through law. Using post-Reconstruction history from 1870 to 1920 as his period of study, 
Smith argues that intellectual and political elites “worked out the most elaborate theories 
of racial and gender hierarchy in the U.S., as evidenced by laws governing everything 
from immigration, deportation, voting rights, electoral institutions, judicial procedures, 
and economic rights.10 Exemplary of this is his discussion of the anthropological work of 
Daniel G. Brinton and its impact on Chinese exclusion policy. As Smith notes, Brinton’s 
contention that each race had a “peculiar mental temperament which has become 
hereditary,” leaving them “constitutionally recreant to codes of civilization,” became part 
and parcel of the justification for anti-immigration acts.11 And he notes that ascriptive 
tensions—be they racial, nativist, or religious—are still powerful today as evidenced by 
the existence of organizations like the Christian Coalition, patterns of  de facto racial 
segregation and right-wing populist electoral campaigns like those run by David Duke 
and Pat Buchanan.12  
To Smith, liberalism is a constitutive, though not always dominant, part of the 
larger political tradition, and in all eras of American political development Americans 
have combined liberal rhetoric with frequently inegalitarian practice.13  Smith’s 
                                                 
10
 Ibid. 559. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid. 563. 
13
 Ibid. 559. 
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examination is important in acknowledging a complexity of ideas in the political tradition 
as well as acknowledging that aspirants to power must make a population see itself “as a 
people” by creating “myths of civic identity” that foster the “requisite sense of people 
hood.”14 Similarly, writing about slavery and ideology, Barbra Jeanne Fields notes that 
while ideology is not the same as propaganda, “the most successful propagandist is one 
who thoroughly understands the ideology of those to be propagandized.” In the context of 
slavery and the Civil War, it would make little sense for white southern planters to try to 
rally poor white yeoman to support the war under the banner of, “We must never let them 
take our slaves” but rather to state, “We will never be slaves.” 15 The relationship between 
ideology and propaganda, as Fields sees it, is one where propaganda reinforces the 
ideology that comes out of people’s everyday existence. Propaganda cannot create 
ideology. It cannot “hand [ideology] down like an old garment,”16 but as a mechanism 
built on repetition and mass appeal, it can reinforce dominant strands of thought in 
everyday life, providing reassurance that the ideology practiced is in fact correct and 
necessary. It is this propaganda function of popular culture in relationship to the 
reinforcement of belief that is missing in American political tradition scholarship and is 
addressed in this study. 
 In pursuing the role of propaganda and popular culture in constituting the 
American political tradition, I employ an overlooked theoretical conception of the 
American political tradition—the countersubversive tradition thesis. Originally put forth 
                                                 
14
 Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Views of Citizenship in the Liberal State (Yale University Press, 
1997), 6. 
15
 Barbra Jeanne Fields, “Slavery, Race and Ideology,” in New Left Review (181, 1990) 111. 
16
 Ibid. 113. 
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by Michael Rogin in 1987 in his work Ronald Reagan: the Movie and other Episodes in 
Political Demonology, the countersubversive tradition is defined as “the creation of 
monsters as a continuing feature of American politics by the inflation, stigmatization, and 
dehumanization of political foes.”17 This type of “political demonology” has both a 
recurring form and content. The practitioner of demonology, through mass propaganda, 
creates a binary division of the world, attributing magical and pervasive power to a 
“conspiratorial center of evil.” Fearing alien penetration, the countersubversive interprets 
grassroots or popular initiatives as signs of alien invasion and subsequently sees 
individuals and select groups as members of this conspiratorial alien evil, now a single 
political body directed by a head. The creation of these monsters is essential for the 
countersubversive in order to give a shape to his anxieties and allow him to indulge in his 
own dangerous desires. In short, demonization allows the countersubversive, in the name 
of battling subversion, to imitate his enemy.18 Consequently, countersubversive politics 
(and the popular texts created by political actors and mass media producers who practice 
them) tends to have a very distinct set of characteristics: a war on local and partial 
loyalties, attachment to secrecy, valuation of hierarchical order, invasiveness and fear of 
boundary invasion, fascination with violence, and a desire to subordinate political variety 
to a dominant authority. Thus practices attributed to subversive groups actually are 
depictions of countersubversive aspirations—from a president who accuses Communists 
of overthrowing free governments so he may do so himself to blaming budget deficits on 
                                                 
17
 Michael Rogin, Ronald Reagan: the Movie and other Episodes in Political Demonology, (University of 
California Press, 1987), xiii. 
18
 Ibid. 
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profligate spending and an invasive State while acting as if the administrative apparatus 
of that State had no part in these decisions.19 
The ideological substance of the countersubversive tradition—with its emphasis 
on the creation of monsters (from the Indian cannibal to the bomb-throwing anarchist20) 
bares a remarkable resemblance to the ascriptive tradition in the multiple traditions thesis 
put forward by Smith six years later. Rogin himself argues that both republicanism and 
Puritanism have played important, though comparatively smaller, roles in constituting the 
American regime than the countersubversive tradition.21  The two theses—while similar 
in substantive critique of liberal traditionalists—differ as to where liberal values fit within 
the development of American political thought. Smith sees a distinct liberal current 
running concurrently with other independent traditions. Additionally, Smith heralds what 
he sees as times when the liberal tradition has been dominant such as in the post-World 
War II Civil Rights and feminist struggles.22 The countersubversive tradition, by contrast, 
accepts the hegemony of liberalism as the dominant ideology in shaping the American 
regime but sees it as a value system which is  constituted by a tenuous welding of two 
strands of political values—individualism and community. The demon becomes the 
proxy for this tension—a manifestation of difference that unites people against it.23 Thus, 
the countersubversive tradition, in  slight juxtaposition to Smith’s multiple traditions 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. 284-285. 
20
 Ibid. xiii. 
21
 Ibid. 283. 
 
22
 Smith, “Multiple Traditions,” 559. 
23
 Rogin, 280-281. 
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thesis, is willing to accept the centrality of liberalism to American politics but explores, 
through a semiotic lens, what exactly liberalism looks like and what its actual practice 
entails in terms of making liberal States function. Seen this way, ascriptivism or 
demonology is not separate from liberalism but is in fact a necessary constitutive part of 
it. The imperialistic and nationalistic necessities that come from an ideology which 
simultaneously emphasizes material acquisition as the highest moral value requires 
justification for the acts that allow the perpetuation of liberal states, such as wars, 
expansion of domestic repression apparatuses, etc., acts that become easier to justify 
when fear of difference is reinforced in popular culture. 
The second difference between the theses regards the point of study and breadth 
in the two conceptions. Smith’s study, which is in many ways the master work on 
American political culture, examines a dynamic and voluminous amount of intellectual 
opinion and law and its consequences to legislation and social policy in a myriad of ways. 
Analysts of the countersubversive tradition take a narrower view, studying the use of 
symbols embedded in cultural documents, particularly mass entertainment, to suggest 
how countersubversive belief penetrates the mass psyche and creates political quiescence 
by transposing its values onto lived experience. The countersubversive thesis also 
suggests, though does not assert definitively, that mass texts are able to reach individuals 
in different and more intimate ways than elite texts such as legal opinions or pieces of 
legislation because they have the ability to some degree mask the social hierarchies from 
which they appear through a perception of independence and sheer ubiquity.24  
                                                 
24
 It should be noted that when I refer to “elite” versus “mass” texts I am referring to audiences rather than 
the constructors of a text. In the latter case, all the examples in this study could be considered “elitist” in 
that they are composed by individuals with political and economic clout—namely the business community 
and conservative politicians— in the American power structure. However, the audiences are decidedly 
 9 
As Michel de Certeau pointed out, textual reading becomes “overprinted by a 
relationship of forces (between teachers and pupils or producers and consumers), whose 
instrument it becomes.” The text can become a cultural weapon, the “pretext for a law 
that legitimizes as ‘literal’ the interpretation given by socially authorized professionals 
and intellectuals.”25 Insofar as hierarchical positions are visible in formal institutions 
(churches, governments, etc.), the acceptance of the literal (or desired) interpretation of 
texts hinges on the legitimacy of these formal institutions in mass society.  DeCerteau 
argues that when an institution loses its legitimacy, the text becomes more subject to the 
individual reader’s silent, “poetic activity” in their private space.26 In a liberal society 
where antipathy to formal government institutions and valuation of the private is part of 
the ideological base of organization, stakeholders in the political economy must find 
ways to try to ensure literal meanings get through to the multitude of private psyches 
while masking their connections to formal hierarchical structures. DeCerteau suggests 
this is done by creating ubiquitous private mechanisms like mass media who, rather than 
attempting to speak through institutional authority, attempt to speak “in the name of 
reality” itself. 
Captured by the radio (the voice is the law) as soon as he awakens, the listener 
walks all day long through the forest of narratives from journalism, advertising, 
and television, narratives that still find time as he is getting ready for bed, to slip a 
few final messages under the portals of sleep. Even more than the God told about 
by the theologians of earlier days, these stories have a providential and 
predestining function: they organize in advance our work, our celebrations, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
different in terms of whom the text is geared toward—with legal doctrine and scholarship fixated on people 
in government and knowledge production vs. ordinary citizens and, in the specific case study here, average 
NFL fans. 
25
 Michel deCerteau, The Practice of Everyday Life, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 
171. 
26
 Ibid. 172 
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even our dreams. Social life multiplies the gestures and modes of behavior 
imprinted by narrative models; it ceasely reproduces and accumulates ‘copies’ of 
our stories.27  
 
Mass texts are thus perceived as an effective vehicle for the reinforcement of 
countersubversive values through their perceived utility as an independent reference for 
an individuals’ everyday reality. Their simultaneous inundation of the audience with 
repetitive symbols function to assure individuals reproduce the social hierarchies and 
“literal” interpretations of society.28 The more the stories and symbols are reproduced, the 
more their frame of reality becomes the only genuine alternative reference point by which 
people can understand their social and political worlds. The suggestion of a connection 
between the power of symbols to shape reality and consequently political behavior was 
perhaps best enunciated by Murray Edelman, who noted that American politics is 
permeated with “condensation symbols.” The power of these symbols lies in their ability 
to “condense into one symbolic event, sign, or patriotic act concepts of pride, anxieties, 
remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promises of future greatness” either 
exclusively or concurrently. By externalizing inner unresolved problems of everyday life, 
these symbols can give emotion to political acts that are far removed from an individuals’ 
everyday experience and which they have no control over by calling for conformity to 
promote social harmony. In essence, they can “create a dramatic symbolic life among 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. 172-173. 
28
 DeCerteau refers to this as the power of citation, which he calls the “ultimate weapon for making people 
believe… By replacing doctrines that have become unbelievable, citation allows the technocratic 
mechanisms to make themselves believable in the name of others.” See Practice of Everyday Life, 189. 
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abstractions” which becomes “a substitute gratification for the pleasure of remolding the 
concrete environment.”29 
Countersubversive values are enveloped in a sophisticated form of mass 
propaganda predicated on condensation symbols. They arouse personal anxiety for 
repressive political purposes. Images of the black rapist or the Indian cannibal play upon 
sexual desire and fear as threats to bodily integrity. The propagandist employing the 
countersubversive tradition expropriates personal experience, speaking for it and not to it 
and in doing so creating what Rogin calls a “false personal.”30  The precise vehicle of 
dissemination of countersubversive symbols is mass media, with newspapers being the 
first vehicle to textually construct images of the childlike Indian31 or imagine vast 
conspiracies of the Illuminati to destroy newly-won independence.32 Yet, according to 
Rogin, it was not until the birth of film as mass entertainment in the early 20th Century 
that countersubversives found their most effective means for dissemination of symbols.  
Rogin points to D.W. Griffith’s early epic commercial film Birth of a Nation as 
the turning point in the power of countersubversive dissemination. Griffith’s Birth joined 
aesthetic invention to mass appeal33 in a way that cut across class, ethnic, and sectional 
lines in ways Progressive cultural reformers could only earlier dream of.34 Moreover, the 
fact that Griffith (a friend of President Woodrow Wilson) presented the movie as 
                                                 
29
 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (second edition), (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1985), 7-9. 
30
 Rogin, 287. 
31
 Ibid. 144. 
32
 Ibid. 56. 
33
 Ibid. 190. 
34
 Ibid. 197. 
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historical fact—despite the fact it was based on the racist novel The Clansmen—allowed 
mass entertainment to function as a narrative of historical reality and in doing so, 
redefined history in a way conducive to countersubversive values and State stakeholder 
interests. As with other condensation symbols, movie images—seen from afar—allowed 
audiences to be voyeurs rather than participants. It broke down defenses and opened 
roads to the unconscious. The size of the image, its reproducibility, the close-up and film-
cut, the magical transformations on screen and the film’s documentary pretense dissolved 
the boundaries that separated audiences in darkened theaters from the screen, pulling 
viewers to an originary condition of illusory unity with an ordinary sense of being. It did 
not render reality. It was reality.35  
As it concerns the question of American political tradition, analysts of Rogin’s 
thesis argue the countersubversive value system is exceptional in its ability to take 
cultural documents, particularly visual ones such as film and now television, and link the 
personal to the political and the illusory to the real. The ability of the image to reach into 
cognitive and emotional sources of being means it has tremendous power. Political 
spectacle and the surveillance state that has grown alongside the proliferation of film and 
television starting during the Cold War period and continuing through to the Bush and 
Obama administrations, uses the power of image in service of deception, rigid and 
deceptive forms of mobilization, and terror. This process makes political events “a 
personalized affair.” Tyrants become humanly likeable as the social realities of their 
tyranny are ignored.36 
                                                 
35
 Ibid. 228-229. 
36
 Michael Parenti, Make Believe Media: The Politics of Entertainment, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1992), 68. 
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 This study seeks to examine the countersubversive tradition by examining a more 
contemporary manifestation than the ones provided by Rogin of Progressive Era and 
Cold War cinema. Whereas Rogin concentrated on the countersubversive potential of the 
visual through made-for-cinema film, I argue that the film visual through programming 
made for private video and television consumption has given the countersubversive 
practitioner even more power to disseminate propaganda—if only for the simple reason 
that television’s reach and capacity to captivate the individual is greater. After all, the act 
of going to the cinema and taking in the theatrical experience, even in a darkened theatre, 
is one that requires some entrance and interaction with a public space. With television 
(and home video), we receive the images in the privacy of our living rooms, making any 
potential public response and discourse difficult.37  
The analytic approach I take also differs from the one Rogin originally used. 
Rogin takes a holistic (if not scattered) approach to examining the countersubversive 
tradition in earlier American epochs and filmography—loosely and often implicitly tying 
the previously aforementioned characteristics of countersubversion into a larger Freudian 
narrative American political culture. In my study, I analyze the characteristics of 
countersubversion elementally, referring to a variety of scholars to strengthen my 
arguments. It is my belief that in looking at what constitutes the individual characteristics 
of the countersubversive tradition in a text it is easier to see how they fit into similar 
theories offered by political scientists and others about the intersections of pop culture, 
propaganda, and political tradition. Lastly, in contrast to Rogin who views the 
countersubversive tradition as a master narrative, I argue that countersubversion is often 
                                                 
37
 Todd Gitlin, “Television’s Screens: Hegemony in Transition,” in American Media and Mass Culture: 
Left Perspectives, ed. Donald Lazere, (University of California Press, 1987), 247. 
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augmented and, perhaps more importantly, contested in other political settings that can 
also been seen in the workings of the case study of the NFL. 
Understanding the Power of Pro Football 
Sport in Scholarly Perspective 
 Just as political science has generally overlooked to a large extent the power of 
popular culture in reinforcing ideological value systems, so too has much of the scholarly 
work on Sport and Society veered away from examining how sport operates as a cohesive 
propaganda tool in the American political tradition. Rooted in Cultural Studies and 
Sociology, most contemporary scholarship on sports in the United States focuses 
primarily on identity issues related to sport (e.g. the construction of racial archetypes) and 
society without offering a distinct political thesis as to why certain issues and values are 
salient in sport. For example, in 2007, the Journal of Sport and Social Issues published a 
special issue on “White Power and Sport in America” which examined how sport 
discourse shapes White supremacist thinking. Of particular note in the issue was Doug 
Hartmann’s analysis of Rush Limbaugh’s firing from ESPN’s NFL pregame show after 
making critical comments regarding Philadelphia Eagles’ African American quarterback 
Donovan McNabb.   
 Hartmann’s analysis of the sports establishment media’s reaction to the Limbaugh 
affair, in which the commentator argued that McNabb was receiving special treatment 
from the media due to his race, found that most of the discourse and dismissal of 
Limbaugh was based less on his conception of “white normative vision and privilege” but 
more so on his transgression of the current dominant perception of sporting as a “Mecca 
 15 
of racial purity and justice.”38 The net result of the study according to the author is that 
“the ideologies and discourses of the sports world cause its adherents to misunderstand 
the problems of race in the United States” and how structural White dominance 
contributes to them.39 
 Hartmann’s work is provocative in that it suggests there is a link between the 
reassurances of ideological systems and sports, yet like work typical of Sport and Society 
scholarship, it finds both the question and the answer in sport itself rather than seeing it 
as an extension of a broader system of propaganda and political economy that attempts to 
reinforce certain base values in mass society. This was not always the case. Writing in 
1979, John Hargreaves argued that sport—State relations must be looked at through the 
lens of “class accommodation.” Just as labor pursued economism to land policy gains 
while conceding influence to dominant groups, so did sport create pathways to new 
material benefits for workers as fans and players while throwing the ideological 
substance of sport to beliefs in capitalism and State prerogatives.40 Today, sport is seen a 
near-exclusive place where these values are promulgated, reinforced, and where they may 
ultimately be challenged (if they are). Exemplary of this is argument is the work of 
George H. Sage in Power and Ideology in American Sport: a Critical Perspective. Sage 
argues that sport is the epicenter for hegemony in American culture, while 
simultaneously arguing that by constructing a “progressive” sport system, one can 
                                                 
38
 Doug Hartmann  “Rush Limbaugh, Donovan McNabb, and A Little Social Concern ,” Journal of Sport 
and Social Issues 31, no.1, 2007: 43-54. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 John Hargreaves, “Sport and Hegemony: Some Theoretical Problems,” in Sport, Culture, and the 
Modern State, Hart Cantelon and Richard Gruneau, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 133. 
 
 16 
transform the inequalities of American life and advance “the democratic imperative” 
which he sees at the heart of American society.41 
Hartmann, perhaps channeling Hargreaves, keenly acknowledges the limits of this 
type of analysis, arguing that there must be an examination of the messages in sport in a 
larger context of other social organizational structures, including a capitalist society and 
by consequence a sporting world driven by market obsession and political dynamics.42 
Fortunately, scholars in other disciplines are starting to engage with this type of analysis. 
In early 2010 political scientist and legal scholar Robert Elias published The Empire 
Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold U.S. Foreign Policy and Promoted the American Way 
Abroad. In the book Elias argues that since the Revolutionary War, baseball—major 
league baseball (MLB) in particular—has “tried to associate itself with values of the 
American Dream. It has “also sought to equate itself with American masculinity and 
patriotism and with U.S. military endeavors in particular.”43 Using a combination of 
political and historical analysis, Elias traces this association between American 
imperialism and baseball through most of America’s major conflicts up until the Iraq War 
of 2004. Talking about the early American imperium in Latin America following the 
Spanish-American War, Elias notes how baseball players and business owners like Albert 
Spalding were eager to use the sport as another means of civilizing the conquered 
territories of places like Puerto Rico and Cuba. 
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To make baseball not just originally American but also currently American, 
Albert Spalding defined it as a part of the U.S. imperialist pageant, proclaiming 
that “wherever a ship floating the Stars and Stripes finds anchorage day to day, 
somewhere on a nearby shore the American National Game is in progress.” The 
expansion of America was confirmed by the expansion of the game.44 
  
What Elias’ work demonstrates is that many of the issues that will be examined in 
this study—the synergy between sport and State prerogatives, fascination with violence 
and militarism, and a fetishism of paternal governance are not unique to the NFL but 
seem to be indicative of larger trends of countersubversion, sport, and the American 
political tradition. Clearly, more work on this subject must be done so the extent of sport-
State synergy in terms of ideology and propaganda can be fully appreciated. Deeper and 
multifaceted approaches, such as a content analysis of sports media coverage as well as 
comparative studies of the role of sport in other countries would undoubtedly help in 
creating a better understanding of countersubversive phenomena in sporting more 
generally. It is my sincere hope that this brief study of NFL filmography gets the 
scholastic ball rolling further on this subject. But before taking on questions of such 
deeper analysis, it is necessary to situate the NFL more generally in American popular 
culture. 
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NFL Television as Economic and Cultural Powerhouse 
 Since its first nationally-televised game—the 1958 NFL Championship game 
between the New York Giants and the Baltimore Colts, the NFL45 has grown into an 
economic and cultural powerhouse that surpasses nearly any other televised sport and 
most scripted prime-time television in terms of mass popularity. As sports journalist 
Mark Yost noted in his book Tailgating, Sacks and Salary Caps: How the NFL Became 
the Most Successful Sports League in History, the NFL commands far and away the most 
revenue in terms of television deals and the most ratings in relation to all of the 
professional sports and television programming in general. According to Yost’s 
compilations, the NFL contracts renewed by ESPN, NBC, CBS, and DirectTV were for 
$1.1 billion, $600 million, 712.5 million, $622.5 million and $700 million respectively.46 
The reason for these huge contract has to do with the sheer ratings power (and thus 
advertising dollars) NFL broadcasts command.  Super Bowl XLIV, which featured the 
upstart New Orleans Saints against League powerhouse Indianapolis, received 106.5 
million viewers, one million more than the final episode of the acclaimed series 
M*A*S*H*.47  An annual Harris Poll measuring the popularity of televised sports found 
30 percent of viewers saying the NFL was their favorite sport in 2007—double that of the 
alleged Great American Pastime of Major League Baseball. It was the 43rd year the NFL 
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has held the number one spot in that poll.48 What is most remarkable about this popularity 
is that it cuts across racial and gender lines—a finding that would seem counterintuitive 
given what scholarship exists on the subject. A 2007 ESPN Sports poll showed 26 
percent of Hispanics choosing pro football as their favorite spectator sport, 12 percentage 
points higher than Major League Baseball. According to Nielson ratings results, the NFL 
received a 12.8 share among African American viewers, with the NBA coming in a 
distant second (7.1).49 
But perhaps the most surprising finding of demographic research done on the 
NFL is the popularity the sport enjoys with women. Results of the 2004 Harris sports poll 
had women respondents rank the NFL first in popularity at 30 percent—nearly a 2-1 
margin over second ranked Major League Baseball. Moreover, the NFL estimates that 
approximately 375,000 women attend NFL games each weekend, and females constitute 
about 50 percent of the NFL’s overall viewership. Nielson ratings showed that in 2007, 
more women watched Super Bowl XLII (69.7 million) than watched the 2007 Academy 
Awards (64.2 million). What makes these findings surprising is that they contradict 
generally held assumptions among media analysts and scholars alike about the NFL as a 
decidedly anti-female vehicle for the reaffirmation of masculinity and male dominance 
over female empowerment.50 While there is undoubtedly some truth to the notion of the 
NFL as a predominantly male-oriented product (the first demographic the NFL touts in 
its promotional literature is its high performance in the 18-45 male viewing 
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demographic), the overall viewing patterns of female viewers seem to suggest that they 
are more than willing spectators and enthusiasts of the sport. Moreover, this scholarship 
seems to discount the very concerted efforts on the part of the League to boost female 
interest in the sport. More than 1 million girls participate in the Pepsi sponsored NFL 
Punt, Pass, and Kick annual competition. In addition, some 10,000 women attend the 
League’s annual “NFL 101 Workshops for Women” which cover nearly every facet of 
the game from life in the NFL to officiating.51 
 Second is the close relationship the NFL enjoys with persons and institutions 
within the American State. From John F. Kennedy’s signing of the Sports Broadcasting 
Bill, which exempted the NFL from anti-trust laws, to the use of Washington Redskins 
home games as a key site for lobbyists to entertain members of Congress52, the NFL has 
had an intimate connection with the people and institutions of American power. Such a 
connection is important as it concerns the countersubversive tradition because it shows 
why the NFL would have an interest in promoting ideology which is concurrent with the 
goals of countersubversives within the American National Security State apparatus, just 
as D.W. Griffith’s relationship with many Progressive reformers played a part in the 
construction of his narratives nearly a century earlier. A slightly more contemporary 
notion of this idea is evident in Carl Boggs’ study of Pearl Harbor. As Boggs notes, 
although Pearl Harbor was a strategic failure for the United States, it is repeatedly 
celebrated in countless cultural texts like parades, books, television, and film, as “the 
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defining memory of the good war legacy” of the United States.53  Boggs specifically 
points out how the symbolism of Pearl Harbor and World War II was played up by the 
Bush Administration and television news outlets such as Fox News in advocating the 
invasion of Iraq, particularly when talking about a revival of the “Normandy spirit” on 
the eve of D-Day in 2003.54  Such programming is highly conducive to countersubversive 
ideology, with its emphasis on condensation symbols and desire to make the personal 
political.  
Methodology 
This study is primarily a content-analysis of NFL-films productions—commercial 
videos sold for fan consumption. The selection of this media is based on the fact that 
NFL films and its founder, Ed Sabol, who for nearly three decades has held the monopoly 
on NFL archival footage, have become the definitive lens through which the game, its 
history, and its values are portrayed—including in television broadcasts. As Sabol’s son 
has noted, the mission of NFL films is to show football through their made for broadcast 
programming “the way Hollywood portrays fiction with dramatic flair in a way that 
portrays the “beauty” of the game. 55 Additionally, as Michael Oriard notes in Brand 
NFL: Making and Selling America’s Favorite Sport, the cinematic techniques spawned 
by the Sabols for private home video consumption (multiple camera angles, an emphasis 
on close-ups, microphones on coaches and players, melodramatic narration) have become 
the standard routines for telecasts of all network games, making live football more 
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comprehensible to television viewers.56 The way we as audiences experience the “live” 
viewing of NFL televised broadcasts and videos cannot be understood without examining 
the source which created them and continues to frame them. Perhaps most importantly, 
NFL films are the only televised media that is produced exclusively by the League itself, 
meaning the images and representations of the sport represent the League and its cultural 
significance as seen by those who own it see it—free from any potential transgressive 
interpretations or the real experiences of the sport by fans as spectators and consumers.  
They are, in short, the official for-profit propaganda arm of the NFL. 
  Questions examined within this content analysis are a) what specific 
characteristics of countersubversion are evident in an NFL Films production? b) What are 
the specific condensation symbols used to promote a given countersubversive value? and 
c) What are the specific theoretical qualities of these symbols that help make 
countersubversive political values retain a sense of intimacy to a viewer? My study is 
broken into three chapters divided along countersubversive themes. The first chapter 
examines fascination with violence and the use of militaristic imagery in NFL-films 
recaps of Super Bowls played during military conflicts. More specifically, I examine how 
these recaps utilize a set of militaristic condensation symbols which normalize violence 
and fear of boundary invasion by transforming the fictional battlefields of football into 
“real” battlefields and thus ready the public for actual military aggression. The second 
chapter examines the use of NFL programming as a surveillance tool which reaffirms 
traditional paternal hierarchies in society through the ascription of particular 
characteristics to executives, coaches, and players. By fixating on ideological aspects of 
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these individuals, NFL programming is able to bring the viewer vicariously into the lives 
of the NFL’s actors while affixing hierarchies to them representative of a particular 
American political nostalgia which affirms a paternalistic world. My third chapter moves 
away from the visual slightly to examine other strategies used by the League in its policy 
appeals to achieve goals, as well as looking at points of contestation the League faces—
namely in stadium financing and labor policy. My conclusion includes a reaffirmation of 
my thesis as well as a brief investigation into the other potential points of contestation 
that exist within the NFL which could directly undermine the countersubversive 
propaganda the League pushes. 
 24 
CHAPTER 1 
THE NFL’S MILTARIST PERSUASION 
 
I was hostile to people who were attacking my body, and I still am. When all else fails 
and it is obvious that it is going to come down to a direct physical confrontation, I 
always thought it reflected a higher degree of intelligence to do the inflicting first. 
- Larry Csonka. Former Dolphins RB57 
 
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of 
today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using 
conventional means. 
 - 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States58 
   
That the National Football League employs the use of violent, militaristic 
symbolism and discourse in the dissemination of its product has been recognized by 
many within the journalistic and academic community for some time.  Journalist Ron 
Powers noted that it was the spectacle of violence disseminated through televised 
broadcast that gave the League its major foothold in American culture by presenting an 
“epic pageant of violence and grace with real fortunes hanging in the balance” that 
burned itself into the imaginations of an audience that had been accustomed to the 
“prepackaged neutralities” of early television.59 Powers’ comment is instructive in that it 
suggests the NFL’s burgeoning cultural power came from its ability to eschew 
representations of safety and consensus on television and replace them with images of 
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warfare complete with violent imagery and a narrative that emphasized the legitimate 
stakes of the outcome of the broadcast.60 
In his work on the use of the male body in Monday Night Football broadcasts 
during the 1994 season, Trujillo notes that the discourse used to describe the players and 
their actions on the field often referred to the players as weapons and their actions as 
military maneuvers. 
During the season, players were described as "weapons," "missiles," "shields," 
''rockets," "hitting machines," and other instruments of violence. And these 
"weapons" engaged in an impressive array of offensive and defensive maneuvers. 
For example, among the terms used by MNF commentators to describe what these 
offensive and defensive weapons (bodies) did on the football field were attack, 
blow away, break through, burst, catapult, club, crash, cripple, crunch, decapitate, 
decimate, destroy, dislodge, dislocate, dismantle, drill, explode, fire, fly, hammer, 
hit, hurdle, jackhammer, kill, launch, mortar, mug, penetrate, plug, pop, pound, 
push, ram, rifle, rip, shoot, shred, slam, slash, smash, smoke, snap, shred, spin, 
stearnroll, tattoo, tomahawk, toss, twist, unload, upend, whack, whip, wound, and 
wreck.61 
  
Similar findings were evident in a later study by Messner, Dunbar, and Hunt on 
what they called they called “the Televised Sports Manhood Formula.” Surveying a 
variety of sports broadcasts, the authors found that references to martial metaphors for an 
action were used nearly five times per every hour of sports broadcast they analyzed, with 
“Monday Night Football” being second only to NBA broadcasts in amount of martial 
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metaphors used. Moreover, their analysis reinforces the frame of warfare or pageant of 
violence that Powers argues made the League the success it is, noting that the “Monday 
Night Football” broadcasts were introduced with exploding graphics and a theme song 
that included lyrics “Like a rocket burning through time and space, The NFL’s best star 
will rock this place…the battle lines are drawn.”62 
While such findings are important in showing the specific ways NFL broadcasts 
use militaristic imagery, they do little to tell us what precise political utility these 
symbols have relative to the larger puzzle of countersubversive elements in the American 
political tradition. While Trujillo does argue in part that the valuation of militarism the 
NFL promotes may relate to changes of gender relations and female boundary invasion 
into male occupations in the 1990s63, such analyses seem insufficient, especially in light 
of aforementioned demographic findings that females constitute 50 percent of the NFL 
broadcast audience. What then, does the purpose of pushing militaristic symbolism in 
NFL broadcasts serve? 
The use of militaristic condensation symbols in NFL videography serves the 
countersubversive agenda by normalizing militarism as a constitutive part of the 
American experience. In doing so, it prepares the audience for mobilization in times of 
actual military conflict to more readily accept the binary divisions and fears of alien 
invasion created by the countersubversive and the appropriateness of military action 
against them. It may also, in times of actual alien penetration, serve to recharge the 
legitimacy of the National Security State when its capacity to protect people is brought 
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into question.  In essence, the NFL’s use of militaristic symbols helps to personalize 
military conflicts by allowing viewers to experience the nationalistic fervor of real 
warfare vicariously by linking it to the viewing of the fictional warfare of pro football.  
For evidence of this linkage I employ content-analysis based case studies of two 
NFL-Films recaps of Super Bowls XXV, XXXVI played during the military conflicts of 
the Gulf War, and the post-9/11 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, respectively. I 
then tie my analysis of these events to the NFL-Films-produced documentary Autumn 
Ritual and other work in the subject and conclude by examining the multiple roles violent 
NFL events play in upholding the countersubversive agenda vis-à-vis the National 
Security State, noting how these roles comport with theoretical ideas on the utility of 
military spectacle as put forth by Foucault, Rousseau, and Hobbes. 
Super Bowl XXV: the Gulf War as a “Struggle of Wills” 
 The film of 1991 Super Bowl XXV commercial home video begins with a shot of 
Eagles Quarterback Randall Cunnigham walking out to the field for the opening day of 
the 1990 season as a the music of a church choir is heard in the background. The shot is 
followed with a cut to New York Giants players marching out to a vacant stadium as the 
sun glares down on their uniforms. As the choir music reaches a crescendo an NFL 
football comes into focus. There is then an immediate cut to Bengals coach Sam Wyche 
screaming “Bury them! You attack them right in their face!” What follows is three 
minutes of clips of various violent plays, with the resultant grunts of pain amplified. 
Interwoven between these shots are clips of female fans screaming, “Get him!” as well as 
various players and coaches making remarks like, “you can see the fear in his eyes,” and, 
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“you have to finish him.” The parade of violent imagery ends with the title “The Road to 
the Super Bowl.”64 
The introduction to the film is instructive as to how the NFL constructs a warfare 
narrative in its product that normalizes the value of combat to its audience. These images 
are important because they provide the political setting which is necessary for the value 
of war to be internalized and accepted as appropriate. As Edelman notes, political settings 
have a contrived character. They are unabashedly built up to emphasize a departure from 
daily routine. Massiveness, ornateness and formality are presented on a scale that focuses 
on the heroic quality of what is taking place. The creation of this space heightens 
sensitivity and conviction among the audience, as the framed actions are no longer 
contested but taken on their own terms. Inconsistencies in fact or normal value structure 
become irrelevant and thus the stage is set for a concentration of suggestions of emotion 
and authority.65  
 “The Road to the Super Bowl” opening montage demonstrates how the NFL 
operates as a political setting where the heroism of the player/soldier is posed against the 
backdrop of ultra-violent, visceral action with spectators of both genders gleefully 
encouraging the combat. Such a presentation masks the very real contradictions of gender 
conflict and the valuations of hierarchy in a liberal regime by obfuscating them in a 
visceral, collectivist spectacle. The shots of the marching Randall Cunnigham and Giants 
players can be seen to represent the march of soldiers onto the battle field, the sunlight 
and choir music are an indication of the moral righteousness of their cause in the 
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upcoming battle. The subsequent three-minute visual onslaught of violent plays 
interwoven with bloodthirsty cries for more punishment—coming from spectator to 
player to coach, from both male and female, helps solidify the normalization of combat 
by obscuring hierarchical boundary divisions of participant vs. spectator, masculine vs. 
feminine, and commander vs. soldier, folding them into one united mass committed to the 
righteous cause of combat displayed before them.  
Yet the normalization of combat values is only half the story. For the 
countersubversive is not merely employing these values for the sake of maintaining 
existing ideological conditions (though that is certainly important) but also to justify real 
political action. The illusory warfare of the NFL can thus serve the purpose of justifying 
real warfare during times of perceived external threats. This is particularly evident in the 
part of the Super Bowl XXV film, “Struggle of Wills” that covers the game itself which 
was played during the first Gulf War.66   
The game recap opens with the shot of a military helicopter flying overhead with 
ominous church bells heard in the background. The narrator remarks, “In a stadium with 
tightest security of any NFL game ever played, Super Bowl XXV began under the 
shadow of war in the Mideast.” A side shot of the stadium with the NFL logo pans to a 
close-up of an American Flag entwined with a yellow ribbon as horns begin to play. The 
next three shots show a police officer in a riot mask riding on horseback, fans being 
meticulously searched by security guards and a widescreen shot of another Army 
helicopter. Concurrent with these shots is a snippet of the radio broadcast of the event 
with the announcers saying “We’re about to say a special hello to the men and women of 
our armed forces in the Persian Gulf, and we respectfully dedicate our broadcast to you 
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wherever you may be over there and may God be with you.” There is a cut to an 
interview with a soldier saying “We want to be here because this is our country, we want 
to fight for it. Our country is taking care of us making sure we get to watch the Super 
Bowl. This is a part of America for us, this is why we’re here.” Underneath him on-
screen text reads “Eastern Saudi Arabia, Super Bowl Sunday -0300 hours.”67 
This opening scene is illuminating in its depictions of the Super Bowl as a 
countersubversive political setting. The first few shots, fixated on the actual agents of the 
National Security State apparatus and the “shadow of war” serve to conjure up the fear of 
potential boundary invasion by a foreign threat. The radio broadcast snippet, with its wish 
that “God be with” the American soldiers overseas solidifies this fear and crates a binary 
division between the God-fearing American warrior and the foreign foe who seeks to 
penetrate the homeland. The interview with the solider in the war zone seeks to close the 
distance between the fictional and real battlefields by making the Super Bowl “part of” 
the National Security State itself as something to be protected. In less than three minutes 
of film, the Super Bowl is transposed from a game to a part of a larger battlefield against 
an ominous alien threat. 
When the actual game recap begins, there is roughly two minutes of violent 
tackles with the grunts of pain and screams for more punishment from coaches similar to 
the opening “Road to the Super Bowl” segment. The narrator remarks, “The silver 
anniversary Super Bowl was the most primal of contests, a classic struggle of wills with 
each team trying to impose its will on the other.”  The subsequent narration of the game 
plays upon the theme of struggle and warfare by emphasizing the tactical changes each 
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team made in trying to win the game. In describing the Giants’ turnaround in the second 
quarter, the narrator notes it was “power football” with “massive blockers whose 
intention was to physically wear down the defense” that helped the Giants gain 
momentum, as well as the play fake which was turned into one of New York’s “many 
lethal weapons.” When Buffalo later scores on a Thurman Thomas run, the narrator calls 
it a “crushing blow.” Interwoven between these tactical narrations with allusions to 
artillery fire and punishment are scenes of fans wearing small American flags and yellow 
ribbons in their hats. The second to last scene ends with the Giants’ celebration and the 
narrator saying “it was a game for the ages, but it was played in an atmosphere where 
more important events of the day were not forgotten.” The film ends with a freeze frame 
of the back of a Giants player holding his child, an American flag in his hand. 
 If the footage of the event prior to the game serves to transform the Super Bowl 
from a fictional to real battle front, the game recap serves to reinforce the superiority of 
the American people in their attempt to eliminate the alien threat. The “struggle of wills” 
is not simply the struggle of two football teams to win a game, but also is the struggle of 
the American will to defeat the will of its enemy on the domestic battlefront. The 
military-tactical discourse, as well as the adjectives used to describe players and their 
actions (the “Old Stallion” O.J. Anderson, the “methodical” drive of Jeff Hostettler) 
denote the martial superiority of the player/soldier in the quest to will their (and the 
nation’s) way to victory. This “will” is also reinforced by the shots of spectators waving 
flags and ribbons displaying their allegiance to the National Security State and their 
refusal to give in to the alien threat that has cast a shadow over the game. That the actual 
outcome of the game does not factor into the frame at first would seem contradictory. 
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One would assume the victor would be perceived as the personification of the American 
will rather than both teams being equally celebrated. This apparent contradiction can be 
rectified by the fact that the intent of the football as battlefield symbolism is to raise the 
specter of alien penetration by bringing the remote but real battlefield home. The binary 
division in this case is not between the squadrons of warriors on the field but between the 
Super Bowl and its viewers as collective entity fighting a foreign foe. As will be shown, 
this changes somewhat when actual alien penetration does occur within the American 
homefront as happened on 9/11. 
Super Bowl XXXVI: Creating an Armed Brotherhood 
 The film begins with a black screen with the words “September 11, 2001.” The 
screen fades out to a clip of Giants linebacker Michael Strahan recounting watching the 
Twin Towers burn from his balcony, not being able to “conceive the fact they could be 
gone.”68  The screen fades to black again before going to a shot of a New York City 
firefighter carrying a banner saying “never forget our brothers” marching towards the 
viewer somberly. Behind him are a goal post and an American flag. Three more 
successive sequences follow with fade-outs and fade-ins of mourning police and other 
personnel carrying flags, with one shot of a female officer wiping a tear away. After the 
last fade out, there is a shot of Eagles players marching towards a nearly field-long 
American flag held by fire-fighters and police officers. The camera pans out to show 
New York Giants players also marching towards the flag. The players, now blended in 
with the State employees, grasp the flag and begin to make it wave.  
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What follows is a minute of shots showing players embracing these same National 
Security State employees, a Boy Scout passing out “United We Stand” flyers and 
American flags to spectators, close-ups of players on the verge of tears, and players 
charging out of their locker rooms holding American flags, screaming loudly. Interwoven 
with these shots is audio of President Bush’s speech following the attack “We will not 
tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. In all that lies before us, may God grant us 
wisdom, and may he watch over the United States of America.” There is then a rapid fire 
sequence of shots of spectators carrying patriotic signs and flags as voluminous chants of 
“USA! USA! USA! are heard. The montage ends with the 49ers breaking huddle saying 
“God Bless America” as the title credits “Road to the Super Bowl” appear on screen. 
The “Road to the Super Bowl” montage from the Super Bowl XXXVI recap 
provides somewhat of a deviation from its counterpart in Super Bowl X XV. The Super 
Bowl XXV “Road to the Super Bowl” opening montage seeks to merely normalize 
militarism as a mass cultural value without context—that is, it celebrates violence as a 
cultural norm without juxtaposing it against a real particular object or event—only an 
imagined one. By contrast, the Super Bowl XXXVI season montage emphasizes the 
specific consequences of alien penetration and the need to reconstitute the damaged body 
politic. The black opening screen and Michael Strahan’s recount of his inability to 
conceive of the absence of the Twin Towers can be seen as a moment where alien 
penetration has led to the absence of authority within the polity. The National Security 
State has failed in its function to protect its territory and people. Such moments are 
problematic because they attack the very foundations of the unimodal value system of a 
regime and encourage the now real threat that outsiders may come in and disrupt the 
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general consensus of how the authority of the National Security State is understood and 
respected.69  
What is needed to repair this damage is a militant spectacle which can reassure 
the mass of the regime’s legitimacy. Foucault noted how this phenomenon played out 
during public executions of the 18th century, calling it a certain mechanism of power “that 
asserted itself as an armed power whose functions of maintaining order were not entirely 
unconnected with the functions of war; of a power that presented rules and obligations as 
personal bonds, a breach of which constituted an offence and called for vengeance.” In 
these spectacles, State power is recharged in the ritual display of its reality as 
superpower.70 The “Road to the Super Bowl” montage serves this recharging purpose by 
intertwining the player-soldiers of the NFL with the citizen-spectators and the agents of 
the National Security State into one united display of militant unity. Understood this way, 
the sequence of shots in the opening montage takes on new meaning. The shots of the 
mourning firefighters and police officers seek to demonstrate the pain of the sovereign at 
its failure while not allowing it to forget its purpose. The Eagles and Giants players 
marching forward toward and then dispersing into the flag-holding crowd of firefighters, 
police officers, and other State officials represents a blending of the fictional warriors 
into a constitutive part of the security apparatus. The shots of the Boy Scout passing out 
flyers to spectators and the players embracing National Security State workers represents 
the renewal of personal bonds and obligations the fictional warriors have in preserving 
the legitimacy of the national security apparatus and its workers as well as the duty of the 
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citizens to obey and make the State’s pain its own. The spectacle reaches its violent 
crescendo with the shots of players charging out of their locker rooms waving flags like a 
cavalry riding into battle as spectators chant feverishly. Much like the scaffold executions 
of the 18th Century, these acts and images following the political attack on the American 
State on 9/11 allow for the vengeance of the people to be become an unobtrusive part of 
the vengeance of the Sovereign71 during the real military conflict that is to follow, 
fighting the demon vicariously through a show of unity. 
This point is illustrated again quite explicitly in the part of the program entitled 
“Perspectives.”The program begins with shots of head coaches marching off fields with 
somber looks on their faces. The narrator states “On the road to the Super Bowl, the 
loneliest figure is often the coach—the man who shoulders the expectations of a season 
and bears responsibility when promise turns to disappointment. This season, the 
challenge was far greater because suddenly even the winning coaches had to deal with 
events beyond their control.” The next scene shows Steelers’ coach Bill Cowher being 
informed by a referee that halftime is going to be extended to 14 minutes due to the 
beginning of the initiation of the bombing of Afghanistan.  The next shot shows Cowher 
looking up at President Bush’s address to the nation which is being broadcast on the 
scoreboard at Heinz Field, with the president saying, “You have my full confidence and 
you will have every tool you need to carry out your duty.” The next shot shows Cowher 
addressing his team, huddled around him, saying, “That puts a lot in perspective. But I’m 
gonna tell you right now, it’s a great country we live in. And that’s about being together. 
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It’s about fighting for a cause. And right now we’re a family, and we’re in our house, and 
right now no one’s gonna take it away from us. Let’s go men!”72 
This scene shows how the vengeance of the sovereign is projected onto the 
vengeance of the people by showing the sovereign (embodied in the president) delegating 
authority to the fictional generals and soldiers of the football team. The narrative remark 
that “even the winning coaches having to deal with events beyond their control” can be 
read as an acknowledgement of the failure of leadership to live up to its duty while 
blaming it on unforeseen and alien causes both in the fictional world of football and the 
real world of the Security State. That the shot of the president’s address on the scoreboard 
pans to Cowher viewing it is of particular importance because it gives the connotation 
that the President is giving orders to Cowher, a fictional general, rather than the actual 
armed forces. Cowher’s address to his team following Bush’s speech is analogous to a 
commander addressing his troops as well as the viewer about the need to come together 
as a familial unit to fight for a cause, and to not let the alien penetration take away “our 
house.”In transposing the vengeance of the sovereign onto the vengeance of the people 
through the coach of a football team, the scene serves two purposes. It not only recharges 
the power of the sovereign by reassuring the viewer of the capacity of leadership to cope 
with crisis,73 but it also makes the fictional battlefield a  part of the real battlefield in the 
larger conflict, much like the imagery of the police and army did in the Super Bowl XXV 
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program. And, much like that program, it is the game narrative itself that represents the 
culmination of this transformation. 
The 2002 Super Bowl XXXVI game recap, entitled “Patriots Day,” begins with a 
slow pan down to the Super Bowl logo cut-out of the continental United States draped in 
red, white and blue. As a somber piano solo plays in the background, the narrator states, 
“played before a backdrop of war, Super Bowl XXXVI was a red, white and blue 
celebration of a nation’s heritage.” A stadium shot of screaming spectators blends into a 
close-up of Paul McCartney onstage shouting “everybody clap your hands for freedom.” 
The narration continues “it was also a tribute to the Americans who in 2001 paid the 
ultimate price for freedom.” What follows is nearly a minute-long of a shot of a black 
banner with the names of 9/11 casualties interwoven with close-ups of players’ tearful 
faces. The narrator resumes, “framed against the traumatic events of 9/11, Super Bowl 
XXXVI reflected the hope of a nation.” On screen a mosaic picture of the Statue of 
Liberty blends into a shot of a re-creation of the raising of the American Flag at Iwo 
Jima. The next two scenes show the respective teams coming out of their locker rooms as 
the narrator describes the Rams as the “Greatest Show on Turf” while noting the Patriots 
were double-digit underdogs. He then adds, “but this team would band together and make 
pro-football’s biggest Sunday their own.” The scene ends with the Patriots charging out 
of their locker room as a large red, white and blue logo entitled “Patriots Day” morphs 
into the Super Bowl XXXVI logo. 
Like the Super Bowl XXV “Struggle of Wills,” the opening scene in “Patriots 
Day” explicitly notes the game is being played under the backdrop of war, implying the 
battlefield of the game is also a battlefield in the actual conflict. However, unlike the 
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beginning of the 1991“Struggle of Wills”, which emphasized the omnipresence of the 
National Security State in the face of potential alien attack, “Patriots Day” emphasizes 
military triumphalism and a celebration of the presumably shared value of freedom. The 
difference in imagery has to do with the real political context under which the fictional 
battle is taking place. In 1991, the contrived threat of alien penetration is necessary as a 
uniting force where real threat is absent and the State is in a superior military position on 
the real battlefield. To bring the battlefield home in any convincing terms, the narrative 
must emphasize the serious linkage between the distant war and the site of the game. By 
contrast, the 2002 narrative need not pay as much attention to the specter of alien 
penetration because it has actually occurred. The task of the audio and visual narrative is 
to unite the mass after the sovereign has been shown to be weak; to demonstrate a 
renewal of commitment to the values of the National Security State by emphasizing 
common symbols of past triumph.  This framing is important because it compels 
attention, emotional release and compliance by addressing the deep and common anxiety 
of the alien attack. As Edelman notes, if there is a profound shared faith in a symbol (e.g. 
the Statue of Liberty, the Iwo Jima photo) it allows that symbol to become an individual 
instrument of the common interest rather than a cognitive and empirical manipulator of 
reality.74 
Another marked contrast, as alluded to earlier, is the framing of the two teams 
relative to the battle narrative. In the case of Super Bowl XXV, both teams are portrayed 
equally as embodiments of the American “will” against a foreign agitator. In “Patriots 
Day,” the teams are framed in a way that showcases a differential in power and values 
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between them. The Rams, previous Super Bowl Champions, are framed as “The Greatest 
Show on Turf”. Careful attention is paid to the superior offensive firepower of the team 
(they scored 500 points in three consecutive seasons), while the shots of them coming out 
of their locker room for the game focus on their individual superstars, and one of the 
players’ statements that they are “the best.” The Patriots, by contrast, are branded as 
underdogs who needed to “band together” to make Super Bowl Sunday “their own.” The 
film makes a careful point to show how the Patriots came out of the locker room “as a 
team” and devotes nearly 20 seconds more to their entrance than that of the Rams. The 
framing is important because it seeks to add a new binary division in the narrative. 
Whereas in Super Bowl XXV the division was between the collective Super Bowl entity 
against the foreign threat, the frame in Super Bowl XXXVI is between the teams as 
personifications of the real combatants in the actual military conflict. Understood this 
way, the offensively powered Rams are a personification of the alien threat with its 
haughtiness and capability to strike anywhere. The description of the Rams as the 
“Greatest Show on Turf” and the emphasis on their boasts and “explosive multiformation 
attack” comports nicely with George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address in January of 
2002 when he talked about the “depth of our enemies' hatred in videos, where they laugh 
about the loss of innocent life.  And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of 
the destruction they design.” Emph. added).75 
By contrast, the emphasis of the Patriots as a team which would band together 
echoes the President’s language in that same speech about America meeting in its “hour 
of suffering” and going on to “rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great 
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coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed 
Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a 
country from brutal oppression.”76 The binary division for the narrative is thus the same 
as the narrative of the real war where America (embodied in the Patriots) must overcome 
the adversity and odds to defeat the arrogant and armed enemy and claim their 
improbable yet righteous victory. The narrative of the remainder of the game recap 
reflects this division, emphasizing the superiority in both tactic and physicality of the 
Patriots over the Rams. Over shots of Patriots players violently hitting their opponents 
(complete with amplified pain grunts), the narrator remarks how the Patriots, “jammed, 
muscled, then blasted the Ram fleet receivers.” By comparison, the Rams’ first scoring 
drive is characterized as “dinky” and the narrator notes that the Patriots defense was a 
“puzzle the Rams hadn’t anticipated.” In between shots of violent tackles and tactical 
narration are scenes of Patriots coaches admonishing players to turn up the physical 
punishment (“pressure in somebody’s face means bad passes”).  As the Patriots scoring 
play at the end of the first half is replayed five times from five different angles in slow 
motion, the narrator remarks “In a Super Bowl steeped in passion and patriotism, the 
team flying highest was wearing red, white, and blue.”77 
The second half narrative notes how Marshall Faulk, the Rams star running back, 
was “buried beneath a wave of red, white, and blue defenders. Even when the Rams 
began to mount a comeback in the 4th quarter, the narration refers to their drives as 
“stumbling.” Following the Rams’ score to bring the game within a touchdown, Patriots 
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defensive coordinator Romeo Crennel is shown screaming, “I need rushers, rushers, 
rushers!” The narrator remarks, “New England focused this painful pressure on the 
League’s MVP as four consecutive shots of Patriots players hitting Kurt Warner are 
shown, the last one a close-up of a Patriots rusher smashing Warner in the face. When the 
Rams tie the game with less than two minutes to play, there is a sideline cut to a Rams 
player saying the Patriots are “weak” and “overrated.” Following the Patriots’ game 
winning field goal, the narrator states that if “dreams are what your heart makes; the 
Patriots had the biggest heart in America.” The next scene shows a Patriots’ helmet being 
held against a background of red, white, and blue confetti as Patriots owner Robert Kraft 
is heard saying “spirituality, faith, and democracy are the cornerstones of our country. 
We are all patriots and tonight the Patriots are world champions.” As shots of crying 
players are shown, the narrator states “It seemed fitting that in a season of grieving, the 
symbol of our nation’s very beginning would be holding the Vince Lombardi trophy at 
the end. And like their country, they were proud to be brothers in arms and proud to be 
Patriots.” The film ends with the Patriots logo on the Super Dome Scoreboard dimly 
visible in a swirl of red, white, and blue.78 
The game recap of Super Bowl XXXVI represents the culmination of the 
recharging of American superpower seen throughout the 2001 season recap. The 
intertwining of the fictional warriors and the National Security State begun on the “Road 
to the Super Bowl” and reinforced in “Perspectives” reaches its violent climax on the 
fictional battlefield with the victory of a team which is imbued with the condensation 
symbols (the minute man logo, red, white and blue uniforms) and values (strength in the 
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collective) needed to recharge the body politic following tremendous damage to the 
sovereign’s legitimacy. Like public executions, which emphasized the atrocity committed 
against the sovereign within the carrying out of justice, the extreme emphasis on the 
punishment of the Rams vicariously serves the necessary purpose of allowing the 
spectator to experience the punishment of the real enemy in a way that takes 
responsibility for the atrocity and all the negative values it embodies such as arrogance 
and calculated violence. Like the execution, the emphasis on the pain and impotence of 
the Rams provides the spectacle of the game with both truth and power—it is a 
culmination of the ritual of the investigation and ceremony in which the sovereign 
triumphs.79 No less important is the focus of Robert Kraft’s remarks upon receiving the 
Lombardi trophy.  While invocations of faith, spirituality and democracy may seem like 
tired clichés, even by Super Bowl standards, they hold powerful political importance 
because a society’s vocabulary reflects past beliefs and values. Thus the magical 
associations that permeate this language are critical for political behavior because they 
lend authority to conventional perceptions and values, thus dulling critical faculties 
regarding the actual events that precipitated the alien penetration. 80 The legitimacy and 
the superpower of the National Security State are recharged through spectacle while the 
capacity to conceive of the crisis in any critical light is diminished. 
 Of course, it could be argued that the documentaries of these Super Bowls and the 
warfare framing are more based on market calculations—that is, the NFL is capitalizing 
on crisis conditions and cashing in on patriotic sentiment to make a buck rather than 
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acting as a deliberate vehicle for countersubversive State war propaganda. While not 
denying this as a probability, the NFL’s own commissioned material on its history and 
other scholarship suggest that the League takes its goal of promoting American values 
seriously somewhat independent of profit as well.81 
 
Autumn Rituals and the NFL’s National Security State Connections 
 In 1986, NFL Films commissioned what was an allegedly “outsider’s” view of 
pro-football in its production of the documentary “Autumn Ritual” that brought together  
what it termed a diverse group of “anthropologists, theologians, philosophers, coaches 
and players,” to explain the game’s significance in American society.82 In fact, the film 
relied heavily on commentary from right-wing speakers, from George Will to Jerry 
Falwell to convicted criminal G. Gordon Liddy. Nevertheless, the film is provocative in 
demonstrating how conscious the League (or at least its players, coaches, and high-profile 
fans) is of its role in creating a normalization of warfare within society and in many ways 
how it openly embraces its role as a proponent for the National Security State in times of 
crisis. One segment of the film begins with a clip of soldiers drilling in Vietnam that cuts 
to Vikings’ players lined up in a similar military formation on the sidelines before a 
game. The scene then cuts to an interview with former player Alex Karras saying “you 
are playing the game of war, and it isn’t with guns, but everything else is the same.” The 
film then cuts to more stock footage of soldiers running through the Vietnamese jungle 
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shouting, “Everybody move out-get out there,” before cutting back to Buccaneers players 
marching on the field. The next 10 minutes of the film feature the same pattern with shots 
of Vietnam combat mixed with violent game footage and commentary by various experts 
woven in between. Of the more noteworthy comments are the ones offered by G. Gordon 
Liddy and former player and assistant coach Bill Curry. Liddy, in explaining the appeal 
of football as a war game says, “If you look at the history of man, the history of man is 
warfare—most men wish they could do things like that…it is an aggressive intelligence. 
It is competitiveness. It is combativeness…the operating principle is Social Darwinism, 
we are all in competition.” Later, Curry says “Something goes on in the huddle that’s 
magic. You take a huddle on a football field and it’s made up of black children and white 
children, northerners and southerners, and liberals and conservatives and they are forced 
not only to get along but to help each other…so you’re not just tolerated, you’re 
accepted. Here we are in the same colored jerseys, same colored helmets, this crazy 
coach is screaming at us and driving us up and down the field and we become 
brothers…all those racial, religious and ethnic differences that kept people apart before 
are beginning to come apart and a great thing happens—men become brothers in huddles. 
And when you leave that huddle, you never quite find it the same again.”83 
 The framing of the similarity between football and warfare—of the transformation 
of the fictional battlefield to the real battlefield is, as has been demonstrated by previous 
examples, part and parcel of NFL films videography of the League. Yet it takes on a 
remarkable self-consciousness here.  Karras’ comment that with exception of guns (and 
lethality) that war and football are “the same” shows how the players in the spectacle 
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understand their role as fictional soldiers and conveys the “reality” of NFL combat to the 
audience. But it is Liddy’s and Curry’s comments that strike at the theoretical heart of 
why the NFL is so important as an instrument of countersubversive ideology—its ability 
to mask real conflicts of a society in spectacle. Liddy’s remarks on the history of man 
being warfare and competition is a not so subtle reiteration of the view of the problem of 
human nature most famously put forth by Hobbes. If men are inherently driven to quarrel 
by “first competition, secondly difference, and thirdly glory” and if such a predisposition 
leads to” war of every man against every man,”84 where no action is unjust and right and 
wrong are irrelevant, there needs to be a common power to keep them in awe.85 To 
Hobbes, this awe-inspiring power was to be given to the sovereign of the commonwealth, 
whose power and strength and the terror thereof would keep people in line out of fear.86 
Of course, the Hobbesian prescription works only so far as the sovereign is able to 
command the terror and respect of the citizens without having to pay deference to 
concepts of individualism and the concurrent inequalities and value differences the liberal 
polity creates. Moreover, if the sovereign fails in its duty (as happened on 9/11 in the 
United States) it allows for the dangerous proposition that people may question the very 
legitimacy of the sovereign’s right to rule. What is then needed is a power that can inspire 
awe as well as mediate value conflicts while still upholding, if not celebrating, the 
legitimacy of the sovereign—in this case the American National Security State. 
 The “magic” that Bill Curry talks about is the mechanisms by which the NFL is 
able to complete this task. The identical uniforms eliminate the conflicts of racism and 
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sectionalism otherwise apparent in American political life. The “crazy coach” leading 
players up and down the sideline becomes a proxy for the actual sovereign as an awe 
inspiring figure who can command the terror of his subjects (and by association the 
audience) into obedience. The results of this are the acceptance of all rather than merely 
the toleration of difference. Individuals, their differences in equality and station, are 
rendered indifferent in the envelopment of the violent spectacle of the game. That the 
NFL explains and celebrates this in its own productions is a powerful statement of how 
the League views its function within contemporary American political life—and indeed 
its relationship with the National Security State itself. As Samantha King has noted, 
following the 9/11 attacks and the declaration of the War on Terror (and then the war in 
Iraq), the NFL began incorporating Bush administration foreign policy into its own 
business promotion. Following the attacks and prior to the previously analyzed Super 
Bowl XXXVI, the NFL made a multimillion dollar commitment to increasing tourism in 
New York City as well as setting up its own disaster relief fund. These events culminated 
in the League’s first Kickoff Weekend extravaganza, featuring several popular music acts 
and celebrities. The event was billed as a “tribute to the American Spirit, the resiliency of 
New Yorkers, and the fact the post-9/11 New York City remains one of the premier 
tourist destinations in the world.” King notes the NFL’s efforts fit the dominant domestic 
national response advocated by the Bush administration following the attacks, 
encouraging people to do good for others while at the same time going about their 
everyday practices of consumption.87 
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 The League’s connection with the National Security State was sharpened even 
further in 2003 following the invasion of Iraq when the League collaborated with Bush 
Administration officials to present what was called, “Operation Tribute to Freedom,” a 
program designed to “reinforce the bond between the citizen and the military” and “help 
Americans express their support for the troops who are returning from operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and who continue to fight in the ongoing effort toward victory in the 
global war on terrorism.” The event, which was the brainchild of then-NFL 
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue and Gen. Richard Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, began with a ceremony at the Oval Office where NFL Executives met with George 
W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, and Colin Powell and presented the President 
with a football which bared the inscription “the first football of the 2003 season, 
presented to President George W. Bush with appreciation.” The program culminated with 
a large-scale celebration on the National Mall co-sponsored by Pepsi, and  included 
performances by Britney Spears, Aerosmith, Mary J. Blige, and Aretha Franklin, who 
sang the national anthem. The 300,000-strong crowd included 25,000 troops and their 
families shipped in for the event by the Department of Defense with the promise of a free 
t-shirt and prime concert viewing. Publicity material produced by the League stated the 
purpose of this “new tradition” was to “celebrate the resilient and indomitable spirit of 
America.”88 
 King’s examination of League press releases suggests the NFL demonstrably 
recognizes its role as a supercharger for the sovereign’s power in times of crisis. And as 
King notes, that it has a “new capacity as something akin to a for-profit marketing arm of 
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the government, immersed in ongoing relationships with a variety of departments and 
offices [so that] we might think of the NFL as a Department of Propaganda, neoliberal 
style89. Indeed, its own films reflect that purpose. 
 
Conclusion: NFL Military Spectacle for the National Security State 
Writing in 1758, Rousseau noted the utility of military spectacle in creating a united 
polity: 
Why should we not found, on the model of military prizes, other prizes for 
gymnastics, wrestling, running, discus, and the various bodily 
exercises…all of the festivals of this sort are expensive only insofar as one 
wishes them to be, and the gathering alone renders them quite 
significant…the people are lively, gay, tender; their hearts are then in their 
eyes as they are always on their lips…all societies constitute but one, all 
become common to all.90  
 
Rousseau keenly understood the stabilizing effect military spectacle-like games 
could have in masking the true identity conflicts one finds in a political State with little to 
no real political or economic equality.91 The NFL performs this function today in the 
National Security State by creating a fictional battle-complete with its own warriors, that 
normalizes violence into liberal culture, while simultaneously masking the real effects of 
it by enveloping its citizens into one mass audience united in celebration of militarist 
spectacle. The NFL aids the  countersubversive in the National Security State by 
providing a site where the practitioner of demonology can raise the specter of alien 
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penetration—fictional or real—and mobilize the public into a defiant mass,  as well as 
recharge the State’s superpower in crises of legitimacy. It is conscious of this role and 
embraces it openly in its own videography and in its open relationship with members of 
the Security State. It is war, and it isn’t with guns, but everything else is the same. 
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CHAPTER 2 
VALUATION OF HIEARCHICAL ORDER: THE NFL’S PASTORAL IDEAL 
 
“The NFL has…stability commensurate with its unparalleled success. Each NFL team 
that fortifies the league rim has a personality as distinctive as its uniform. Yet there is an 
unwavering commitment to preserving the integrity of the whole.” 
—“This is the NFL 2008-2009” 92 
 
“On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over 
conflict and discord.”—Barack Obama, Inaugural Address93 
 
 In Autumn Ritual, George Will argues the appeal of the NFL comes from its 
ability to reintroduce the “heroic dimension” back to the “dreadful tranquility” of modern 
ordered life by offering a product that combines violence punctuated by committee 
meetings.”94 Will’s observation is important as it concerns the NFL’s relation to the 
countersubversive tradition because it articulates the task the countersubversive faces in 
affirming hierarchical relations of power by constructing myths that appeal to liberal 
sensibilities of individuality, while simultaneously assuring the audience remains passive 
and subject to the paternal orderings by which they are governed. As Rogin states, the 
power of film and mass media more generally as a surveillance tool comes from its 
power to absorb a viewer into the fictional world while also acknowledging to some 
extent the reality of the ideal figures it presents. 
 
The split between the star’s life on-and off-screen is joined to another division 
within film itself. The moviegoer not only sees an ideal self; he or she also 
observes forbidden acts that can be enjoyed at a distance, protecting the ideal self 
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from contamination. In that mode the motion picture viewer resembles the 
surveillant. Voyeurism protects the self from both participation and observation.95 
  
In simpler terms, media’s surveillance power, that is, its power to act as a sort of 
overseer of general opinion on political issues, is derived from its ability to allow the 
average viewer to experience the lives of those in higher stations without having to give 
them the real spaces of participation in which to achieve them. It ensures the continued 
maintenance of the hierarchies of society by allowing people to experience their mythic 
power vicariously. NFL films serve as an agent of surveillance for the countersubversive 
practitioner in this capacity by creating programming with narratives about owners, 
executives, and coaches that emphasizes particular personality traits representative of a 
type of nostalgia which depicts them as leaders in a protective, paternal world, what 
Rogin refers to as the pastoral hero characterization.96 The need for the idyllic political 
pastoral hero comes from the desire to tame the wilderness of uncertainty that comes 
from political modernization. While in past literature this was emphasized through 
iconography such as the West and the childlike, cannibalistic Indian incapable of self-
governance, in the case of NFL filmography, the dangers of the wilderness are 
represented by the players, who in their own on-and-off the field depictions are shown as 
childlike, violent, and incapable of great performance absent the paternal surveillance 
provided by the pastoral leader embodied in the coaches, owners and executives in the 
League hierarchy. The power of NFL programming as a surveillance mechanism operates 
by first bringing the viewer into the lives of the NFL’s actors while affixing 
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characteristics to them that represent a particular American political nostalgia which 
affirms a paternalistic world. 
In examining these facets of the NFL as a hierarchy-affirming surveillance tool, I 
look at the NFL-films produced NFL’s Greatest Players and Coaches, noting how the 
characteristics that define the “greatness” of owners and executives—chiefly paternal 
surveillance and leadership, align with the qualities inherent in pastoral heroism. I then 
examine clips of NFL players from Autumn Ritual as well the Super Bowl XXIX and 
XXXI, paying attention to how the players are ascribed characteristics that necessitate a 
pastoral figure’s authority over them. I then examine how the pastoral ideal is portrayed 
in head coaches, paying particular attention to how the Foucualdian concept of 
normalization, which creates systems of evaluation that induce conformity through 
discipline of the body, are lauded as evidence of a coach’s greatness as a pastoral figure. I 
conclude by demonstrating how these characterizations affect the viewer’s larger 
perception and acquiescence to paternal ordering hierarchy in actual political 
presentation. 
The Greatest: Owners and Executives as Pastoral Heroes 
 The segment of “The Greatest Players and Coaches” film which examines 
coaches and executives begins with a brief scene of a faded locker room and the title logo 
“The Men Behind the Men.” The scene cuts to a close-up of a flag of the NFL shield 
flying in the wind. The shot pans out to show the NFL flag parallel to the American flag 
at Soldier Field in Chicago as the narrator states, “The NFL flag flies highest over 
Chicago, Illinois.” The shot fades to the lone figure of late Chicago Bears owner and 
founder George Halas, whom the narrator calls “one of the most important men in the 
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history of pro football.” The next minute of film contains footage of Halas’ 
accomplishments as an owner and coach, mixing decades-old footage with commentary 
by Halas on his founding of the franchise. Over footage of Hall of Fame players like Dick 
Butkus, the narrator notes that it was Halas’ ability to “produce” players and defenses 
that could “strangle and mangle opponents” which made him a successful coach and the 
“father of pro-football.” The scene ends with an interview with the late Hall of Fame 
running back Red Grange discussing Halas’ numerous roles within the Bears 
organization, concluding, “he was a one man gang.”97 
 The next scene begins with a close-up of late Pittsburgh Steelers founder and 
owner Art Rooney. The narrator states “Art Rooney was the patriarch of the Pittsburgh 
Steelers and one of pro football’s most revered owners.” After a successive sequence of 
shots detailing Rooney’s management of the Steelers from one of the worst franchises in 
the game to “one of the greatest,” the film cuts to footage of the Steelers’ victory in Super 
Bowl IX and an interview with former Steelers’ linebacker Andy Russell relating how 
after the Steelers’ first Super Bowl victory he realized he had to give the game ball to 
“The Chief.” The narrator then states, “He won four Super Bowls, but it was his 
generosity and love for his players that set him apart from other owners….he was a man 
as great outside of the game as he was inside of it, a true man of the people.” The scene 
cuts to an interview with Hall of Fame Defensive Tackle Joe Greene who remarks that 
Rooney “knew every player…he didn’t talk to you and look away, not look you in the 
eye, and he did that when he walked through the community. His community.” 
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 These opening scenes of the “Men Behind the Men” segment are important in that 
they suggest to the audience the importance of pastoral qualities and how deeply they are 
intertwined with surveillance and order. The title of the segment establishes that the 
“greatness” of men is overseen by other men—individuals operating behind the scenes 
who, through their surveillance of those lower than them, mold a chaotic mass into 
something functional. As Rogin notes, one of the characteristics of the pastoral hero 
archetype in American politics is his ability to “create domestic national order and 
purpose” in the same vein as earlier leaders conquered nature in the nineteenth century. 
The modern model of technological liberal reform reflects pastoral childhood dreams of 
patriarchal control over uncertain frontiers.98   
In the case of the scene on George Halas, the close-up of the NFL flag running 
parallel to the American flag that “flies highest” over the home of the “father of pro-
football” not only creates the perception of the equivalency of the NFL to the American 
State (much as the militaristic and nationalistic imagery did in the previously studied 
Super Bowl films), but also locates the power of the NFL’s founding in a lone patriarchal 
figure, analogous to the 19th Century frontiersmen entering and sanctifying the wilderness 
or the Progressive Era reformer instilling discipline on a burgeoning empire and the new 
domestic corporate-capitalist system.99 The interview with Red Grange in which Halas is 
described as a “one man gang” who oversees and “takes care of” every aspect of the 
franchise from the ticket sales to the police at Wrigley Field, combine with the shots of a 
solitary Halas walking on Soldier Field to complete the transformation of the owner into 
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the idyllic hero by creating a dramaturgical impression based on popular characterisitcs 
associated with effective authority.100  
Linguist George Lakoff notes that the moral authority of the patriarchal figure is 
derived in part from the authority figure’s ability to know what is best for the community 
and the person subject to authority as well as the social recognition that the authority 
figure has responsibility for the well-being of the community and the person subject to 
authority.101 The scene on Art Rooney shows how his success as an owner and his moral 
authority are derived from his ability to purportedly “know” every player and to walk 
through “his community.” It is through this knowing, achieved through the surveillance 
of the team (which in the narrative becomes his community), that the “patriarch” of the 
Steelers is able to achieve success. Of course, as the narrator’s statement about Rooney 
being “set apart” from other owners implies, his surveillance needs to be perceived as a 
virtue that works for a greater community. It must not only be equated with the success of 
victory but also have a moral quality that demonstrates an overall unity of form that 
makes an entity strong and resistant to uncertain pressure—what Lakoff refers to as 
“Moral Wholeness.”102 This particular characteristic, while not particularly elaborated on 
in the film, is a fixture of media coverage of the Rooney family, coverage of the Steelers’ 
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prior to their Super Bowl XLIII appearance noting “The Rooney name is synonymous 
with stability, which is rare in the era of the quick fix.”103 
If NFL owners are depicted as having moral authority primarily through their 
ability to survey and order the nascent communities that their football teams represent, 
executives are shown as deriving their moral authority from the capacity to take these 
communities and become leaders who innovate while maintaining the traditions of 
surveillance first established by patriarchs like Halas and Rooney. In the case of NFL 
executives, this is evidenced in the scene focusing on the first two commissioners of the 
League, Bert Bell and Pete Rozelle. The segment on Burt Bell opens with a wide shot of 
a crowd gathered in Narbeth, Pennsylvania where against the backdrop of red, white and 
blue bunting, a plaque is unveiled honoring his historic accomplishments. The scene cuts 
to a close-up of former Eagles president Harry Gamble noting how Bert Bell “did it all. 
He sold the tickets. He coached the team. And he brought the gate receipts home in a 
cigar box.” There is then a cut to former Eagles center Chuck Bednarik, a close-up of 
Bell’s face behind him saying “the old-timers know and I hope these guys playing today 
remember a guy by the name of Bert Bell. If it wasn’t for him you wouldn’t be a 
millionaire.” The next five shots are of various executives and journalists as well as 
Bell’s daughter, all commenting on Bell’s personal characteristics as they related to 
establishing the League. Of particular note are comments made by a former executive and 
one sports journalist. Former Raider’s executive Al LoCasale states “Bert Bell was a guy 
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who, for the first time, people could point to in football, as they had in baseball with 
[former Baseball Commissioner] Landis and they knew who was in charge.” Journalist 
Larry Merchant, when discussing Bell’s draft system,104 notes that “it led us to a future 
where New York was not the center of the universe anymore…that you could play in 
Green Bay or anywhere else and become a national figure.” His daughter Jane says, “He 
dearly loved the football players. He would always conclude his talks with the teams 
with, ‘this is my home phone number. If you have any problems at all, you can call me at 
anytime of the day or night.’” The scene on Bell ends with a return to the speech by 
Gamble, stating “he targeted all his hopes and ambitions, his dreams and his struggles to 
professional football. He took a game and made it America’s passion.” Interwoven with 
speech are shots of players from the 1950s to the late 1990s running onto the football 
field. The segment ends with a shot of an anonymous fan holding a large American flag 
as the shot pans down to the football field.105 
The segment immediately following the profile on Bell begins with a marching 
procession of banners of each NFL team’s logo. The narrator states, “While Bert Bell 
made the NFL a popular sport, Commissioner Pete Rozelle made it number one, 
replacing baseball as America’s favorite pastime.” The next shot shows an upward angle 
of a flagpole with the United States’, State of California’s, and the NFL’s flags all flying 
in the wind. Over stills of Rozelle shaking hands with various owners, Hall of Fame 
Cowboys President Tex Schramm says “He [Rozelle] was able to accomplish things 
because he was able to bring diverse groups of egotistical, strong-minded owners and 
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managers together and do things that were necessary for the betterment of the League—
not necessarily the individual clubs and he was the glue—he made it work.” As Schramm 
talks about Rozelle’s creation of the Super Bowl and his ability to turn it into an 
“international event,” a wide stadium shot cuts to close-ups of telecasters from around the 
world touting the game. As shots of Rozelle conferring with various players, owners and 
coaches such as Vince Lombardi roll, former Giants’ General Manager George Young 
states, “If you think in terms of egos of coaches and egos of players, egos of player union 
and egos of owners, and having to massage all the different people he’s had to massage 
and then to have some policies that move you in the same direction that’s a great 
accomplishment.” As a still of Rozelle meeting with Lyndon Johnson is shown, Young 
states, “I mean politicians don’t last that long—who lasts in office 30 years having to do 
that kind of massaging and manipulating? The scene ends with an interview with late 
49ers coach Bill Walsh stating” I think he’s brought a serenity, a calmness to a sport that 
obviously has violence and is so competitive that sometimes the worst side of people 
show. He’s brought grace and style to that and if the public has been more responsive to 
the National Football League it’s because of Pete Rozelle.” 
The scenes on the NFL’s first two commissioners demonstrate at once the 
political necessity and paradoxes of leadership as a political symbol. As Edelman notes 
the central connotation of leadership is innovation: leaders point the way so that others 
can emulate their initiatives. At the same time, political leaders must conform to widely 
held ideology in order to succeed and maintain their higher office. Yet it is these apparent 
contradictions that give the symbol of the leader its great political utility. Leaders win 
their acclaim (and thus their authority) and their followers gain their reassurance and 
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hope through courses of action that reaffirm accepted ideologies while connoting 
boldness, intelligence, change, and paternal protection. Leaders, in essence, become 
symbolic representations which make a complex and largely unknowable world 
understandable by becoming objectifications of whatever pleases or worries observers 
because it is easy to identify with them, support or oppose them, love or hate them.106  
This concept is played out in the scene on Bert Bell first through the framing of 
the commissioner as a political hero, as evidenced by the public honoring of the man 
complete with the requisite red, white, and blue décor, and then through the rhetorical 
emphasis on Bell as a paternal surveillance figure who, much like the one-man gang 
Halas, “did it all” when it came to running the League. Moreover, his “love” for the 
football players and his willingness to give his phone number out can be seen as 
analogous to Art Rooney’s ability to “know” every player in “his community.” In this 
way, the tradition of surveillance established by the patriarchs Halas and Rooney is 
carried on by Bell while at the same time he is praised for leading the NFL into the future 
by creating a system where players could become national figures and the League could 
become more profitable.  
The leadership frame is completed by the comments from Bednarik and LoCasale, 
who speak of Bell as an objectification of the leadership traits of change and 
accountability respectively. Bednarik’s admonishment to younger players about their 
wealthy status being owed to Bell can be seen as a projection of the change characteristic 
of leadership put onto Bell even if such a frame does not align with actual history.107 
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LoCasale’s comments about Bell being a figure people could point to and know was in 
charge are important in that the assumption of responsibility is key. In a world where 
general uncertainty is the rule, people who feel burdened by the responsibility of making 
difficult choices about their own lives and the lives of others can transfer that onus on to 
the leader.108 Understood this way, Gamble’s concluding remark that Bell “targeted all 
his hopes and ambitions, his dreams and his struggles” to the NFL is, in fact, a projection 
of the collective struggles of a burgeoning sports league onto one man who becomes the 
symbol of effective leadership for his organization. 
If the qualities of the executive as leader frame are established in the Bell scene, 
they are solidified if not reified in the scene on Pete Rozelle. The opening shots of the 
marching NFL banners and waving flags can be seen to represent the League’s cultural 
power as a fictional military arm of the American State as well as the visual placement of 
the NFL as America’s pastime. Like the scene on Bell, these shots (along with the still of 
Rozelle with President Johnson) also depict Rozelle as not only a sports figure but a 
political figure as well. What reifies Rozelle as a model political leader for the League is 
the imagery and language used in regard to how he managed the League hierarchy. As 
Edelman notes, it is expected that the top executive in every large-scale organization will 
periodically proclaim his willingness, even eagerness to take personal responsibility for 
the acts of subordinates. Such an approach helps strengthen the leader’s authority by 
                                                                                                                                                 
USFL), and bitter League-NFLPA struggles that involved three strikes (1974, 1982, and 1987) as well as 
several court decisions. 
108
 Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (1988: Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), 39. 
 61 
ascribing the ability to cope to the leader while protecting subordinates from 
accountability or blame for incompetence or inability to perform their functions.109 
 As the comments by Schramm, Young, and Walsh indicate it was precisely 
Rozelle’s ability to assume (or at least project) responsibility that made him an effective 
leader for the NFL. Schramm’s comments about Rozelle’s ability to be “the glue” which 
bonded diverse “strong minded” owners and managers together for the betterment of the 
League is an acknowledgment of Rozelle’s ability to assume responsibility for the 
inability of subordinate pieces of the League and to overcome conflicts of narrow self-
interest in order to better its standing in the public mind and consumer market. Young’s 
comments and the shots of Rozelle conversing with coaches, in boardrooms and on the 
sidelines, articulate the specifics of how Rozelle was able to assuage the subordinate parts 
of the NFL (owners, coaches, players) by “manipulating and massaging” their egos 
through his administrative responsibilities as the NFL’s chief executive. Using the power 
of the administrative agency allows adversary groups to oppose each other in a forum 
which replaces tension with a measure of clarity, meaning confidence, and security.110 By 
assuming the responsibility of being an iconic administrative figurehead for the League, 
Rozelle was able to allow conflicts to be resolved by injecting his personal characteristics 
into the administrative process, thus manipulating disparate subordinate parts into some 
semblance of unity of purpose.111 As Young’s comments infer, his success in doing so, 
and in turn his success as a political leader as opposed to failed political leaders like 
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Johnson), is measured by the length of his incumbency, which connotes an ability to act 
when others are bewildered.112 
Bill Walsh’s comments complete the frame of Rozelle as a reified leader by 
throwing them against the Hobbesian backdrop the NFL operates under. Like G. Gordon 
Liddy beforehand, Walsh reaffirms the view that the NFL is a dramaturgical 
representation of Hobbes’ state of war, punctuated by violence and competition, in need 
of some force to inspire awe in order to bring together its anarchic parts. However, in an 
organizational form which rests to some degree on consent of its membership (be it an 
association like the NFL or a liberal State), the Hobbesian prescription of direct terror 
becomes unfeasible, therefore a leader must find other means by which to gain the 
acquiescence of those who would be subordinated to him. As the comments from 
Schramm, Young, and Walsh indicate, the perception of Rozelle was that he was able to 
overcome the egos of disparate parts of the League by transposing his personality onto 
the organization. In doing so he was assuming responsibility for the public face of the 
League which, in turn, allowed him to manipulate potentially antagonistic subordinates 
with assurances that, in accepting his policies, they were assuaging themselves of 
responsibility for any of their individual actions, which would otherwise have damaged 
the perceived integrity of the game. 
 What is particularly noteworthy about the efficacy of this type of leadership is 
that its uses passivity rather than aggression to accomplish its goals. As previously noted, 
Hobbesian understanding of unity implies the direct use of force in order to keep 
individuals together through fear. The passive leadership style as exemplified by Rozelle, 
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by contrast, relies largely on appearance and downplaying of controversy to achieve 
consensus.  As stated by Edelman, this style consists of the avoidance of firm positions 
on controversial subjects while at the same time posturing as a protagonist against an 
evanescent enemy, thereby retaining or increasing political support from large numbers 
of antagonists on both sides of controversies. Edelman sees Eisenhower and Kennedy as 
exemplars of this style in the modern presidency. 
Such a leader may declare he will support the law of the land while refusing to 
endorse the morality of the Supreme Court desegregation decision. He may, like 
Kennedy, firmly and frequently declare that government has a responsibility to 
support prosperity and quicken economic growth while refraining from 
embarking on controversial economic policies to increase productivity or cut 
unemployment. The chief executive may maintain his ‘symbolic leadership’ 
through ascriptions of his ability to cope, through publicized action on 
noncontroversial policies or on trivia, and through a dramaturgical performance 
emphasizing traits popularly associated with leadership…113  
  
In the case of Rozelle, much of his ability to manage egos came from his ability to 
present himself as a guardian against the evanescent threats to the integrity of the game 
(gambling, labor unrest, drug abuse), while essentially doing very little to address the 
substance of the perceived threats, leaving such tasks to subordinates or producing 
comparatively mild sanctions or investigations into these issues.114 It is perhaps not 
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surprising then, in the scene speaking of Rozelle’s ability to last longer than most 
politicians, that he is juxtaposed against Lyndon Johnson, a failed political leader who 
pursued controversial domestic (particularly progressive racial) and foreign policies that, 
rather than glossing over the concerns of potential antagonists with “grace and style,” 
took them head on into political ruin. As Walsh’s comments make clear, Rozelle 
succeeded because he made the public more responsive to the NFL through the 
appearance of calmness and serenity. Thus in a tumultuous time of numerous scandals 
and evidence that the game as both sport itself and as a cultural icon was suffering from 
severe structural issues that could damage its legitimacy, not to mention the bodies of the 
players that made it popular in the first place, Rozelle came across as a responsive 
executive who remained positive about his product in spite of it all. Such a frame is a 
marked contrast from the one ascribed to the foundation of the League as 
entertainment—its players. 
Pastoral Objects: The Primitive Player 
 As noted by Rogin, the countersubversive tradition, which defines itself against 
alien threats to the American way of life and sanctions violent and/or exclusionary 
policies towards them, began with a fear of “primitivism and disorder” in response to the 
peoples of color that inhabited the continent as natives or slaves. In the case of the Indian 
in early America, they came to embody the “masterless men,” emblematic of chaos who, 
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in European culture represented the breakdown of traditional society. Allegedly living 
without government and freed from European constraints of family, church, and village, 
they were depicted as “idle, wandering savages” who engaged in incest, cannibalism, 
devil worship and murder.115 And while some early writers wrote of the nobility of the 
savage, it was never divorced from the needs of the white American power structure. 
Both images of primitivism appropriated Indians for white purposes. Both made 
the Indians children of nature instead of creators and inhabitants of their own 
cultures…Neither the noble nor the devilish savage could coexist with the 
advancing of white civilization. Both images rationalized the dispossession of the 
tribes.116 
  
Similarly, blacks, who were often stereotyped as sexual predators, also posed a 
primitive threat to the social order—though not through the threat of freedom but the 
threat of reversing labor dependency.117 While some of the nastier illustrations of these 
particular cases have to some degree been downplayed in popular culture as time has 
progressed, the base fears of primitivism and social upheaval they were associated with 
are still well at work within popular culture today and particularly evident in NFL 
filmography as it concerns the foundation of the NFL as popular entertainment—its 
players. 
 Evidence of this notion is found in the beginning of the Autumn Ritual 
documentary and “The Road to the Super Bowl” segments in the Super Bowl XXIX, and 
XXXI recaps. Autumn Ritual begins with a stock footage shot of a naked African child 
walking out of a hut. The shot then cuts to Oakland Raiders players walking out of a 
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locker room tunnel onto the football field. The next 20 seconds alternate between 
successive shots of tribal children engaged various activities (face painting, marching, 
chanting, and violent play) and NFL players doing nearly mirror actions. Later, former 
Bengals coach Sam Wyche talks about the ritual of offensive linemen known as 
“grazing” where players would stand around prior to game time. His description 
coincides with close-up shots of players chewing gum which then cuts to footage of an 
Ox chewing cud. Conservative theologian Michael Novak then remarks that one of the 
great appeals of football is its “celebration of the elemental physical life, the elemental 
lusts and hates and fears.” He states “beyond any theory of enlightenment or liberalism or 
rationality there are enacted in football elemental passions and elemental desires.” Over 
his words are shots of players involved in fights, violent tackles, and aggressive entrances 
onto the playing field.118 
 Novak’s comments are provocative in that they illuminate the paradox the 
countersubversive faces in the creation of texts: on the one hand, it is the showcasing of 
the primitive or the elemental which often gives a text its mass appeal. On the other hand, 
it is precisely these elemental passions, what Rogin calls “the regressive impulses” to the 
primitive or communal versus the independent and isolated which the countersubversive 
practitioner seeks to combat. This paradox is reconciled by presenting otherwise 
appealing primitive characters as child-like or animalistic and in need of some parental 
figure. In the case of the Autumn Ritual narrative, the film draws parallels between 
football players as primitive children or animals who thrive on aggression. This 
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conception is expanded upon in “The Road to the Super Bowl Recaps” for games XXIX 
and XXXI respectively. 
 The “Road to the Super Bowl” segment for Super Bowl XXIX includes a segment 
on what is deemed the “maturing” process of an NFL quarterback, particularly the 
“emotional pressures” they endure. As a shot of a young Brett Favre being sacked is 
shown, the narrator notes that a quarterback “must learn to crawl” before he can run, and 
that when he “takes those first steps, he is like a puppy dog chasing his tail.” The scene 
cuts to then-Packers coach Mike Holmgren exasperated at Favre, telling him to settle 
down. The narrator states, with “Mike Holmgren’s help Brett Favre finally reached 
football puberty.”119 The message is clear. Absent the paternal authority of a coach, a 
player is limited in intelligence or capability and cannot grow to the potential needed for 
his position.  
It is further honed in the “Road to the Super Bowl” for Super Bowl XXXI in a 
segment entitled “The Sting.”  The segment begins with NFL films President Steve Sabol 
explaining how “head coaches were expected to win with new players and many of those 
players were not easy to coach.” The segment then cuts to successive shots of players like 
Deion Sanders dancing on the field, Brett Favre playing air guitar, a Cowboys lineman 
calling himself ‘sexy,’ and two Bills players embracing and kissing each other on the 
cheek. The narrator states, “Today’s NFL player is high-profile, a product of free agency 
and freedom of expression.120 He is self-assured, sheltered, and sensitive.” The next 
sequence of shots shows players with face paint, afro-hair styles, and coach Marty 
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Schottenheimer angrily pointing out to a player on the sideline that he has an earring on. 
The segment ends with the narrator stating “each year it gets tougher to build a team for 
the embattled head coach.”121 Like the Super Bowl XXIX segment, “The Sting” shows 
the players as having childlike qualities of egotism and sensitivity that need to be 
overcome by embattled head coaches. The painted faces, wild hairdos, and dances invoke 
the specter of primitivism first shown in the juxtaposition of shots of tribal children and 
players in Autumn Ritual.  
 “The Sting” segment also adds the threat of sexuality into the primitive fear 
narrative. Players, in the case of the shots here, all African American players, are shown 
expressing sexuality (“I’m sexy”) and in the case of the Bills players what could be 
interpreted as a homosexual act. Such scenes not only evoke (however subtly) the already 
ingrained stereotype which associated blacks and sexual deviancy, but also challenge the 
pastoral/Strict Father frame by challenging the base assumption that sex is heterosexual 
sex in which men are dominant over women and that this natural order carries over to the 
moral order.122 Men affirming feminine qualities become part of what is “embattling” to 
the paternal figure, in this case the head coach. In framing the players as childlike, sexual 
and primitive the narratives of these segments reinforce the necessity of the hierarchical 
structure the League, as well as most corporate-capitalist enterprises operates under. 
Without it, sensitive, sheltered workers would revert to primitive, anarchic tendencies. A 
figure is required who can justify or neutralize these tendencies by acting on the bodies 
and minds of the players—in the case of the NFL, the head coach. 
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Head Coaches and the Process of Normalization  
Returning to the “Men Behind the Men” segment in the NFL’s Greatest Players 
and Coaches, I have shown how different parts in the NFL hierarchy derive their 
authority in the tradition of pastoral heroes. For owners, moral authority is derived 
through the power to order new frontiers through the surveillance of the nascent 
communities they found. For executives, moral authority is derived from their capacity to 
be seen as leaders who innovate on the foundations set forth by the patriarchs while 
simultaneously keeping up the appearance of tradition and integrity of the game often 
through the passive projection of responsibility and ability to cope with outside threats. 
For the coach, often the most visible position in the NFL hierarchy, moral authority is 
derived from the ability to create systems of normalization which, in turn, docilize 
players so they can be molded into successful teams. Of the coaches profiled in the “Men 
Behind the Men” segment, two stand out as the exemplars of these qualities: Paul Brown 
and Chuck Knoll. 
Paul Brown and the Creation of Normalization  
The scene on Paul Brown opens with a black and white still of the late coach as 
the narrator states, “Paul Brown was one of the greatest coaches in pro-football history.” 
Over grainy footage of an old Cleveland Browns game, the narrator states “all football 
came from Amos Alonzo Stagg [the first paid coach in American football history], but 
pro football came from Paul Brown.” Over alternating black and white shots of Brown on 
the sidelines, doing calisthenics with his players and watching as players hit dummies in 
practices, the narrator states, “Brown was also a great innovator. He called all the 
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Browns’ plays and used messenger guards to shuttle in his calls. His training techniques 
were light-years ahead of his contemporaries, and his summer camps were laboratories 
for experimentation that ultimately became NFL titles. For player safety, he invented the 
facemask. Everything he did resulted in victories.” 
 As the scene turns to color shots following the recollection of Brown becoming 
owner and coach of the Cincinnati Bengals, there is a cut to an interview with Hall of 
Fame running back Jim Brown who says, “I was happy to play for Paul Brown because 
Paul was very strict. He was the king. All you had to do was deal with him and if you 
dealt with him successfully, then you didn’t have to worry about the other guys.” The 
Brown clip then cuts to an interview with Hall of Fame running back Bobby Mitchell 
saying “with myself, he would always say little things like, ‘maybe you’re not good 
enough Bobby Mitchell—you keep hurting our football team.’ So then I’d go out there 
and take it 60. The scene then shifts back to grainy footage of a Cleveland Browns back 
running for a touchdown as the narrator remarks, “Brown was a demanding taskmaster, 
who saw a multitude of sins not only in defeat but in victory.” The scene the returns to 
the interview with Mitchell who says, “He’d come in and walk in front of the group, and 
he’d say ‘we’ll go over what we did wrong in the game’—he’d take out this piece of 
paper and it would drop all the way to the floor and I said, ‘gee we just beat these guys 
38-0.’” 
 The scene then cuts to an interview with Hall of Fame quarterback Otto Graham. 
Graham states, “Over the years, there were times that I loved him. There are times that I 
hated him.” As the scene cuts to black and white footage of Brown in front of a 
chalkboard lecturing players, Graham states, “But when I went into coaching myself, I 
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found myself doing exactly the same things he used to do, saying some of the same 
things he used to say.” The segment ends with Brown marching down the sideline of an 
empty stadium, with Graham saying “playing for Paul Brown and the Cleveland Browns 
was probably the best thing that ever happened to me.” 
Chuck Knoll: Normalization Perfected 
The scene on Chuck Knoll begins with a slow, upward pan on a still of Knoll 
surrounded by four Super Bowl trophies. The narrator states, “Chuck Knoll won the most 
Superbowls of any headcoach, but in his rookie year in 1969, he inherited one of the 
worst franchises in NFL history. The Steelers were dubbed the lovable losers.” After a 
grainy color close-up of Knoll, the scene cuts to an interview with linebacker Andy 
Russell who says, “The first meeting with Chuck Knoll, we had a lot of cynical, old 
veteran players, who’d seen a lot of coaches come and go and there was sort of this 
attitude, ‘Show me your stuff coach.” As the segment cuts to footage of Knoll putting 
players through practice drills, Russell says, “He gave a speech where he was essentially 
saying, ‘Look, the reason you’ve been losing has nothing to do with your attitude. The 
reason you’re losing is you’re not good enough. You can’t run fast enough, you’re not 
quick enough. You’re not skilled enough…He said, “I’m gonna get rid of most of you, 
I’m gonna bring in the guys who can play these defenses. They’re gonna be harder—I’m 
gonna make you do the hard stuff.”  
 The segment then cuts to a close-up of a retired Knoll saying, “We say ‘whatever 
it takes, and a lot of people have different meanings for that. But what it meant for us 
was, as members of a team, you have to do whatever you can do to help the team win.” 
The segment cuts to shots of various Steelers making violent tackles and difficult 
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receptions as Knoll says, “Now if someone else is not functioning very well, they may be 
sick…someone else has to step up. ‘Whatever it takes’ means team, and I think our guys 
bought into that.” The segment cuts to shots of the Steelers victory in Super Bowl IX as 
they narrator states, “In Super Bowl IX, Knoll’s Steelers used defense and the running 
game to defeat the Minnesota Vikings. It then cuts to shots of the Steelers’ two Super 
Bowl victories over the Cowboys win and the Rams, where the narrator states “his 
Steelers cemented their legacy as the team of the 70’s.” The scene ends with the Steelers’ 
huddled around Knoll as Andy Russell says, “Coach Knoll would always say, ‘If they’re 
trying to fool you, that means they can’t beat you with their best stuff, they’re desperate. 
Just line up and say, ‘Come on.’ That was Chuck Knoll.” 
 The process of normalization, as defined by Foucault, seeks to instill docility 
through a micro-economy of penal mechanisms. 
It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of following the overall 
rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be 
respected or as an optimum towards which one must move. It measures in 
quantitative terms and hiearchizes in terms of value of the abilities, the level, the 
‘nature’ of individuals. It introduces, through this ‘value-giving’ measure, the 
constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that 
will define difference in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of 
the abnormal.123 
  
The process of normalization can be seen in both the scenes on Brown and Knoll. 
The narration in the scene on Brown practically reads as a tribute to normalization 
techniques. The shots of Brown leading his players in callisthenic exercises and in 
training camp demonstrate the quantitative systems of measurement (ultimately resultant 
in “victories”) Brown created to establish the minimum threshold for acceptable 
                                                 
123
 Foucault, 183. 
 73 
performance as it concerned the body of each player. The narrator’s remark that Brown 
was a “demanding taskmaster” who saw a “multitude of sins” in both wins and losses 
seeks to frame Brown’s behavior and coaching technique in religious light—perhaps 
unsurprising since it was religious orders who were the first to truly experiment with the 
disciplinary techniques of supervision and management of time in relation to the bodily 
subject.124 The narrative legitimizes Brown’s authority by linking it to older, presumably 
more omniscient forms of the same disciplinary practice. 
The interviews with Mitchell, Brown, and Graham provide the qualitative 
evidence as to how these instruments of normalization are internalized by the object of 
discipline—in this case the players. The remarks by Bobby Mitchell, whose recollection 
of Brown saying he “was not good enough” and “hurting our football team” inspired him 
to then make a big play demonstrates how creating limits of difference in performance 
seek to reorient what the disciplinarian sees as inadequate measurements of value back 
into the optimal level of docility or minimum threshold of acceptable performance. In 
addition, his recollection of Brown pulling out a list of all the things the team “did 
wrong” even in a decisive victory shows how specific and explicit the economy of 
discipline is in terms of creating spaces that provide fixed positions and establish 
operational links between the potentially disparate parts125 of a larger corporate body like 
a team.  
Furthermore, Jim Brown’s affirmation of Brown’s strictness and his 
acknowledgment that the coach was “the king” illustrates how normalization reorients the 
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power relationship of the player-coach from one that could be adversarial to one that 
makes the disciplinary object respect and assign a high political value to the 
disciplinarian. The normalizing tactic of value assignment thus works to not only create a 
system of differentiation which docilizes players but also instills obedience by allowing 
players to assign higher values to those above them. Ultimately, these scenes assign a 
moral authority to Brown that corresponds to paternalistic qualities embodied in the 
pastoral tradition—analogous to what Lakoff refers to as the Strict-Father model of 
morality. The ability of Brown to produce players through the construction of strict 
normalization schemes demonstrates the notion inherent in the pastoral/Strict Father 
mythology that the paternal figure must, through his authority, “create more self-
disciplined people.”126 
  This is best evidenced in the remarks by Graham when he states that, despite his 
feelings of both love and hate for Brown, playing for him was “one of the best things that 
ever happened” to him. Graham’s note that despite his conflicted feelings towards 
Brown, when he entered Brown’s position he found himself doing many of the same 
things, speaks to the ability of the disciplinary power to sustain itself by its own 
mechanisms—constantly replicating itself without having to resort to more extreme 
corporal forms of control. 127  
Normalization is also the key point of emphasis for the scene on Knoll, albeit with 
an even more specific fixation on the body as an object of discipline. This is first 
evidenced by Russell’s recollection of Knoll’s first speech to the team, which emphasized 
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that the team’s failure was not due to any deficiency in attitude but rather in the lack of 
physical regimentation necessary to succeed. Seen this way, Knoll’s statements to his 
team that they couldn’t run “fast enough,” were not “quick enough,” and not “skilled 
enough” are examples of him establishing a measurable, minimal threshold of a player’s 
value. Failure to live up to these standards would lead to penalization through 
replacement—“getting rid of” those who are at the limits of abnormality in favor of those 
who can “do the hard stuff.” 
The end result of this process of normalization, as evidenced by Knoll’s own 
comments, is a complete docilization of the player’s body into conformity with 
hierarchical prerogatives, and the transformation of the body as an individual unit into a 
mechanized part of a larger, almost industrial apparatus. Knoll’s statement that if 
someone “is not functioning very well” or is “sick” that “someone else has to step up” 
might as well have come from a factory manager or corporate manager. Indeed, this latter 
point has been referred to as the “Taylorization” of the body, depictions of which are 
rampant throughout commercial sport culture.128 These depictions not only reinforce the 
hierarchy in the sport, but the industrial-administrative hierarchy that most of the viewers 
are familiar with in reality.  
It should not come as a surprise that, in distinction to the scenes on owners and 
executives, which relied a good deal on close-ups of the subject (concurrent with an 
authority derived from surveillance power), most of the imagery within the scenes on 
head coaches maintains a focus on the actual game footage and the players’ bodies in 
motion rather than on the coach himself. The point of emphasis of the coach’s authority 
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within the game’s hierarchy is his ability to produce, through the process of 
normalization, a “mechanics of power” which defines not only how one may have a hold 
over others’ bodies, but also that they can operate how they wish, with the techniques, 
speed and efficiency they determine. He increases the force of the body in terms of 
economic utility while simultaneously diminishing the potential of these bodies to be 
disobedient.129 He is the disciplinarian who in the most direct way operates on the bodies 
which at once prop up the corporate apparatus of the League while also being a point of 
potential resistance.  
In the idealized depiction of the NFL, the power to discipline subordinate parts of 
the game’s hierarchy is exercised through mechanisms of varying visibility and direct 
action. The owner instills discipline through quiet surveillance of subordinate parts 
around him. His apparent omnipresence molds behavior of subordinate actors by creating 
senses of community that allow power to be seen in its face yet unseen in its effect. It is a 
panoptic discipline.130 The executive instills discipline in much the same way—by 
assuming responsibility for and becoming the de facto figurehead of the League, he is 
creating an artificial person—not unlike the Hobbesian sovereign, who is respected for 
his ability to defend the organization from internal and external threats to its integrity.131 
In these latter cases, the instilling of discipline is achieved more or less through resigned 
means. While the executive may have higher visibility than the owner, both employ a 
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disciplinary power that is more passive in that it does not act directly on the physical 
bodies of subordinates. By contrast, the scenes on Brown and Knoll make clear that the 
head coach instills discipline on the bodies of the lowest subordinate part of the League—
the players, through slightly more direct processes of normalization. 
Conclusion: Pastoralism as Constructed Necessity 
 During the pregame broadcast for Super Bowl XLIII, NBC and the NFL aired a 
live interview with President Obama from the map room in the White House. The 
President was dressed in a casual work-shirt and slacks. Most of the questions from 
interviewer Matt Lauer revolved around the president’s family life and interest in sports, 
yet a few dealt with issues of presumed substance. For example, in discussing the 
president’s daily security briefings, Lauer asked, “There are tens of millions of people 
watching this broadcast right now. If they were to have access to the same information 
you have now on a daily basis, how much less sleep would we all be getting?” The 
president responded by stating, “We’ve got real threats, and we need to remain vigilant, 
but the quality of our armed forces has never been better. When you meet the people who 
are charged with keeping America safe it gives you enormous confidence.”132 
 The interview is provocative as it concerns the construction of the pastoral ideal 
in NFL videography not only because it shows an actual political interview taking place 
in the broadcast space of the League’s biggest event (suggesting there is a deeper 
relationship between the League and political institutions, a topic which will be explored 
in the following chapter), but in how specifically the president is characterized. Using the 
map room as a the setting for the interview, having the president dressed in casual attire, 
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and focusing primarily on the president as a father and husband frames the president as 
the paternal figure of nostalgic lore while presenting him in way that is voyeuristically 
accessible to the viewer’s frame of reference. Lauer’s question regarding the security 
briefings reaffirms the necessity of the president having exclusivity to his power—for if 
we all knew what he did we would be sleepless, much like a child who may worry about 
monsters under the bed. The president’s ability to maintain vigilance and his confidence 
in the hierarchy of people that keeps America safe projects the ability to cope with threats 
that completes the pastoral figure’s importance in maintaining passivity amongst the 
mass of citizens more generally. 
 The brief interview demonstrates how much of the pastoral politics found in NFL-
films material is easily visible and derived from the political world. In less than 11 
minutes, the president is seen as having the paternal vigilance of the NFL patriarchs, the 
ability to cope and project confidence like commissioners, as well as to normalize a 
system of hierarchy which places confidence in leadership to protect against threats 
which the public, in its child-like state (much like the players on a football team) cannot 
know about. To paraphrase Bill Walsh, the political administrative apparatus, punctuated 
with uncertainty and violence, is tamed by a sense of calmness and serenity which 
removes the worst sides of people in favor of the whole.
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CHAPTER 3 
BEYOND COUNTERSUBVERSION: OTHER LEAGUE STRATEGIES AND 
CONTESTING FORCES 
 
“In order to gain and to hold the esteem of men it is not sufficient merely to possess 
wealth or power. The wealth or power must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded 
only on evidence.” 
—Thornstein Veblen133 
 
“Arlington is nobody’s damn suburb” 
— former Arlington, TX Mayor Richard Greene134 
  
So far, this study has looked at the dissemination of elements of the 
countersubversive tradition in NFL filmography and televised content. The reason for this 
is, as stated before, the prominence of the League as a cultural icon in that medium, as 
well as the small screen’s unique ability to penetrate individuals’ psyches both intimately 
and repeatedly. This does not mean, however, that the propagation of countersubversive 
belief and resultant policy that reflects elements of it are always directly relegated and the 
resultant transmission of small screen imagery alone. Indeed, to delegate this function 
exclusively to mass texts like film would mean that the producer of countersubversive 
material would need to be certain that the viewers would absorb and accept without 
hesitation the message the countersubversive wishes to convey, rather than create their 
own counter-meanings. While, as mentioned, recitation of the message may mitigate this 
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possibility, it is not a panacea. 135  Other strategies must be (and are) employed 
simultaneously with transmission of video texts to reinforce beliefs “on the ground.” 
 Moreover, this study has only briefly touched on the actual policy incentives that 
induce entities like the NFL to encode countersubversive belief into their cultural texts.  
For a league that Michael Oriard has noted publicly disavows making political 
statements,136 this study suggests there are in fact many political messages being 
encapsulated in NFL programming. Thus one would expect to find some suggestion of 
actual policy inducements and political contestation of policies which entice the League 
to engage in propagation of countersubversive messages in its product that benefits the 
League’s bottom line as a corporate institution. This chapter examines both the question 
of additional strategies that work with countersubversive propagation and the policy 
inducements which make it practical for the League to employ them through the issues of 
public financing of football stadiums and labor struggles. In examining these topics, I 
hope to show how other strategies and contested politics help shape the League’s 
propagandistic response to a much more complicated political world. 
Stadium Politics 
 In its 2008 season “Kickoff” literature, the League boldly claims that the 
construction and renovation of football stadiums is a positive boon to communities 
because, aside from economic benefits of job creation through the stadium itself and 
“satellite” businesses, new stadiums “become hubs of community activity and sources of 
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civic pride” for those cities who house them137. Such hyperbole from the League’s most 
unadulterated propaganda, however attractive to a fan or marketing student, masks the 
real story of the NFL’s political economy, one that relies heavily on the upward 
redistribution of public revenue to extremely wealthy team owners as well as “satellite” 
coalitions of corporations and public representatives that support them. Yet the story 
behind stadium pushes by the League and its corporate-government sponsors is in many 
ways an outcome to a larger story of highly collectivistic internal economic arrangements 
which have been the driving impetus behind the League’s popularity and conflicts over 
status that this success has wrought. 
 As Mark Yost notes in his study of the League’s economic success, from its 
earliest days, the NFL has utilized a system of managed cooperation where both revenue 
(brought in largely through ever-growing television contracts as well as merchandising 
agreements and ticket sales) and talent (through the NFL Draft and a strict salary cap) are 
shared equally throughout the teams so that, “by operating in a quasisocialistic system, 
the NFL guarantees fans the high-caliber competition that has kept stadium seats filled 
and television viewers enthralled.”138 As Yost notes, while these touted agreements have 
created the competitive parity or “Any Given Sunday” appeal that has allowed the 
League to thrive, they have also been a point of contention between larger market 
“entrepreneurial” owners and small market owners largely due to the one unshared 
revenue source for teams—stadium revenue, which now accounts for slightly over 25 
percent of a team’s annual profit.139  Yet while smaller market owners grouse about the 
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larger market owners stadium revenues threatening the “level playing field” of the game 
and its status within the American sports community, the actual substance of stadium 
debate suggests that it is a conflict over profit numbers and interclass standing rather than 
actual competitiveness that creates friction within the NFL’s Fortune 500-type ownership 
class.140 
 Again going to Yost’s study, the author notes that the biggest discrepancy and 
point of contention between the NFL owners is not actual stadium seating capacity for the 
average ticketholder but rather “premium seating”—box seats, private suites, private 
stadium clubs and personal seat licenses which contributes greatly to a team’s overall 
profitability —and hence stature and wealth of an owner relative to his colleagues in the 
League and in boardrooms elsewhere. This point is illustrated by Yost’s descriptions of 
the activity that occurs at luxury suites on game days at these often publicly subsidized 
stadiums. 
Frequent guests in [Redskins’ owner] Snyder’s owner’s box include 
former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and his wife, NBC 
news correspondent Andrea Mitchell, [former and late] congressman and 
NFL quarterback Jack Kemp, and other Washington power players. In 
Charlotte, bankers rather than politicians hobnob on the club level of Bank 
of America Stadium before Carolina Panthers’ games. At Denver’s 
Invesco Field at Mile High, oil, gas, and real estate executives gather 
before Broncos games in the club level sponsored by United Airlines.141 
  
From Yost’s description it appears that insofar as stadiums serve as places of 
community and civic pride, the community being talked about is not the public at large 
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but in fact the corporate-political community of a given city.  Sociologists Kevin Delany 
and Rick Eckstein argue that it is precisely the need to draw new executive talent into the 
corporate community that makes local corporate growth coalitions partner with, if not 
take the lead in, promoting public stadium subsidies for team owners. As one executive in 
their study commented, new stadiums (and their luxury boxes) are the sort of amenity 
that corporations need to draw the “A players” to their midsized cities.142 In essence, the 
attraction of public underwriting of stadiums is to give team owners and corporate elites 
in cities “something to show off.”143 
 The analyses put forth by Yost, Delaney, and Eckstein suggest that the impetus 
for stadium construction in the NFL comes not from the need to increase team profit for 
on-the-field competitive capacity but rather to increase profit for the sake of cultivating 
an image of powerful accumulative capability within the class station of owners and their 
corporate peers. As Delaney and Eckstein note, many of the “postindustrial” cities where 
stadium pushes from owners and corporate growth coalitions have occurred are based on 
the perception held by the local growth coalitions that their cities “radiate a negative 
impression to the surrounding world” and that the flurry of new stadium construction 
gives corporate executives looking to impress other high level executive talent the 
impression that their location is a “city on the move.”144 That it is widely accepted by 
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corporate elites that these types of projects have little public net economic benefit145 is all 
the more important because as theorist Thornstein Veblen observed, in order for 
conspicuous expenditure to be reputable, it must be an expenditure on superfluities that is 
ultimately wasteful. No merit would accrue from the consumption of the bare necessities 
of life [including, perhaps, education, mass transit, and affordable housing] except by 
comparison with the abjectly poor who are not, under the pecuniary standard, worthy of 
invidious comparison.146 Executives who pride themselves on being touted as civic actors 
want “visible monuments to their efforts.” It is far more appreciable to a corporate 
director to push to build a stadium than to try to improve inner-city test scores, especially 
when the new stadium could be named after their company.147 
 Of course, simply desiring to create points of invidious comparison among an 
elite social grouping does not translate into a political consensus that such ideas are 
worthy of public expenditure. Essentially, owners and corporate backers of publicly 
subsidized stadiums must create an atmosphere of opinion that ties the stadium to an 
idealized depiction of the community versus its real self and its neighbors. And indeed, as 
Delaney and Eckstein’s work shows, it is precisely this strategy, what they call “the 
manipulation of community self esteem and community collective conscience” that has 
been the modus operandi for stadiums backers for most of the latter decade.148 
Those attempting to manipulate internal community self-esteem usually warn 
local residents about the dangers of slipping to the depths of some nearby city, 
which has been socially constructed as inferior. A community’s decline to minor 
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league status, they argue, will surely be exacerbated by not building a new 
stadium, which would precipitate a team’s decision to leave the city. So in 
Cleveland we kept hearing that having professional sports (especially in new 
stadiums) would keep the city from becoming another Akron. In Cincinnati, the 
presence of professional sports would prevent the city from turning into 
Louisville. Stadium proponents in Minneapolis and Denver did not want to 
become colder versions of Omaha.149 
 
Corporate growth coalitions take ideals of invidious comparison and transpose 
them on to the entire communities in which they operate, creating a sense that it is the 
sports teams’ presence which constitutes the social glue of the community. As journalists 
Neil DeMause and Joanna Cagan point out in their stadium study, Field of Schemes, for 
generations, “the special emotional presence of the local team has been played up—by 
sports promoters, by the local media, by fans themselves. These are the home teams: 
unique, regional representations of a city’s heart and soul.”150 Backers of stadiums and 
related projects go so far with this idea as to include nostalgic aspects of a city’s 
particular historical character into the designs of new projects, reinventing the modern 
mall experience into a genuine walk down memory lane.151 That these projects often wipe 
out the actual remnants of what was left of the city’s history, and that these new stadiums, 
purported to have the capacity to obliterate class differences, are largely attractive due to 
their luxury suites152 becomes an afterthought, building the stadium to keep the team 
becomes the point of departure for even more conspicuous consumption at public cost.153 
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 Owners and growth coalitions are aided in their stadium subsidy plans by 
politicians who are eager to enhance their image among groups of constituents.  
Exemplary of this notion is former Ohio Hamilton County commissioner Bob 
Bedinghaus, discussed by Delaney and Eckstein in their study of the successful football 
stadium effort in Cincinnati. A self-styled “no new taxes” Republican, in 1996 he became 
the spokesperson for a half-percent county sales tax increase to fund construction of a 
new stadium for the Bengals. Under the agreement, which passed by a county-wide 
margin of 61 percent (though support was significantly lower in urban Cincinnati proper), 
the city would construct the $270 million stadium and pay for operations with the 
Bengals receiving all revenues while paying a mere rent of $1.1 million for nine years 
after which it would be dropped to nothing.154  Moreover, a 3 percent ticket tax proposal 
that was meant to allocate money to the city’s crumbling public school system was 
quickly dropped as Bengals’s ownership argued it would hamper the team’s ability to be 
competitive. As the project got underway and costs ballooned to over $400 million, 
Bedinghaus saw his popularity fade and subsequently lost his reelection bid, despite 
receiving over $144,000 from growth coalition leader and mogul Carl Linder (owner of 
the Reds, American-Financial Group, Chiquita, Stokely-Van Camp and Financial World). 
For his part, Bedinghaus remained defiant against criticisms that he had sold the county 
and city out, claiming “the people of southwestern Ohio would ‘feel good’ about these 
ballparks after the hoopla over money died down.” Bengals owner Mike Brown 
compared him to Winston Churchill, who lost his election after winning a World War. 155 
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 The Cincinnati case illustrates the role public political actors play in the policy 
process of publicly subsidized stadiums. They are, as Delaney and Eckstein state, the 
public persona of a corporate community that may otherwise choose to remain covert in 
their machinations to raise the level of superfluous spending in a given city.156 In the case 
of Bob Bedinghaus, the folksy narrative of a conservative politician sitting down at his 
kitchen table to work out a stadium funding plan was a mask for the true crafting of the 
regressive tax by six businessmen and a consultant brought in from outside the city.157 
The reason for putting the politician out in front of a stadium effort has to do with what 
Edelman calls the preservation of the myth of popular and legislative supremacy. The 
high school civics version of American government which argues that there is a 
continuous, mechanical line of influence from ‘the people’ to administration and that 
policy reflects popular will is such a strong symbol that it is scarcely challenged.158 Thus, 
putting the face of the popular will on a plan gives it a sort of trust that may otherwise be 
lacking. 
 This is not to say that politicians who support these stadium subsidy efforts are 
inherently corrupt or view themselves simply as corporate mouthpieces (campaign 
contributions and access to luxury boxes following the completion of these stadiums 
notwithstanding), but rather that they face both ideological and electoral pressures that 
make them more often than not willing to support pro-stadium forces by default.  
Ideologically, like most citizens, politicians tend to grant more legitimacy to powerful 
people or experts. Operating within institutional political structures which grant more 
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legitimacy to powerful individuals, stadium backers rarely have to “fight city hall” 
because political elites have been conditioned to accept by default that new stadiums 
bring economic growth or heightened community self-esteem.159 Moreover, population 
flight from cities has made suburban areas grow considerably more powerful in political 
strength. As the suburbs grow, quality-of-life issues important to city residents become 
underfunded as pressure is put on politicians to provide entertainment and other 
diversions for suburbanites. This shift puts cities (and thus city and county politicians) in 
a bind of having to attract both tourists and suburbanites and their money to maintain 
upkeep of these projects as well as other urban priorities.160 DeMause and Cagan point 
out this phenomenon more starkly in an interview with New York City planner Lukas 
Herbert, who compares the Jets’ unsuccessful Manhattan-area stadium bid with the 
ultimately successful stadium bid of the Yankees in the Bronx. 
“There’s clearly a double standard here, says Herbert, noting that council 
member Christine Quinn, who was at the forefront of the campaign to stop 
the Jets’ stadium in her Manhattan district, pushed for quick approval of 
the Yankees’ and Mets’ plans once she was elected council speaker. 
Herbert concludes: “Stadiums are bad in middle-class or upper middle-
class white neighborhoods, but they’re wonderful in black or Hispanic 
neighborhoods where everyone is poor. There are a lot of middle class 
people that live in this neighborhood, but there’s also a lot of poor people 
here. And we were just told to shut up and take the project because it is 
good for us.”161 
  
Politicians are thus bound, not only by the pro-subsidy mentality of team owners 
and corporate growth coalitions, but also by their own internalization of the value of 
invidious comparison as a policy motivator. In addition, the external suburban desire to 
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increase consumption and leisure time forces politicians to back wasteful activities in 
order to maintain electoral support even if it means slashing funding for more 
economically productive activities in the urban center. The poor and urban residents, 
lacking the ability to compete with middle and upper classes in political power, are thus 
saddled with these expenditures, often accepting them on the grounds that they will 
provide some marginal economic benefit or at least restore aesthetic pride to the city.162 
All of these issues revolving around conspicuous consumption including growth coalition 
pressure, suburban vs. urban politics and class differentiation would come up again in 
other cases, though perhaps no more noticeably in recent years than in the push by 
Cowboys owner Jerry Jones to get a new stadium built in the greater Dallas area. 
The Cowboys and Arlington: the Public Financing of Jerry World 
 While the story of the $1.5 billion Cowboys Stadium could be said to begin 
officially in 2004 when a group of local Arlington businessmen and politicians started the 
“Touchdown Arlington!” campaign to win public support for a sales tax increase to 
procure some $325 million (and climbing) in funds for a new stadium to lure the 
Cowboys to the city, the issue of subsidizing what is considered to be the most 
impressive structure ever built for an NFL team actually began in earnest with the 
purchase of the team by oil mogul Jerry Jones in 1989. Jones became one of the early 
“entrepreneurial owners” in the League—looking to extract revenue from sources that 
other teams were not exploiting. Jones found most of his opportunities in stadium 
revenue opportunities—selling naming and concession rights to corporations such as 
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Pepsi, Nike, and American Express. However, Jones’ crowning achievement at the time, 
as Oriard notes, was turning Texas Stadium into “a playground for wealthy Texans,” by 
doubling the price of tickets, replacing 2,500 ordinary seats with 100 more luxury suites 
(on top of the present 289), and instituting seat licenses of up to $15,000 some of them 
for season tickets held by former Cowboy players and employees.”163 Despite drawing a 
verbal rebuke from the League for violating the previously discussed norms of 
cooperation that had defined League business, Jones remained unrepentant, arguing that 
the best commercial deals would go to those who “aggressively” pursued them.164 
 The actions taken by Jones seem to represent the previously discussed valuation 
of public subsidizing of private stadiums in that they depict Jones as the quintessential 
man of leisure who spends, not only for higher efficiency and comfort in his enterprise 
and well being, but also because such expenditure is evidence of wealth and is thus 
honorific in his social group. Under the influence of the belief of invidious comparison, 
collective rebukes can be ignored because it is understood that whatever might be said 
rhetorically, failure to spend in due quantity would become a mark of deformity and 
demerit.165 The growth of this “punctilious discrimination” transforms the man of leisure 
into a “connoisseur incredible viands of merit” in things considered “manly and 
seemly”.166 In Jones’ case, his success in stadium revenue pushing has made him the 
most admired connoisseur of how to extract public money for new private stadiums. 
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 The Cowboys Stadium deal with the city of Arlington came after a decade of 
starts-and-fits to get a new stadium built in Irving, Texas (the now former and longtime 
home of the team) or in Dallas proper. Irving became an unlikely prospect for a 
rebuilding, given anti-tax sentiment among the older population there (in 1996 the city 
voted to drop out of the mass transit system, which was looking for a 1 percent sales tax 
increase to maintain operations167). With Irving out of the picture, Jones focused on 
returning the team to the Fair Park area of Dallas, with a new stadium being the 
centerpiece of a larger urban redevelopment scheme. Letters and editorials in The Dallas 
Morning News attempted to appeal to economic arguments as well community self-
esteem and consciousness in order to mobilize people behind the effort. The paper itself 
argued that the stadium was a “unique opportunity to use the stadium as an economic 
magnet to spur development.”168 More impassioned pleas for support came from more or 
less anonymous citizens who attempted to link, not only the Cowboys, but football itself 
to the city’s larger historical identity. In one letter, “a lifelong fan” appealed to the Dallas 
officials to “rescue” a rare opportunity to restore the city’s heritage. 
Football has differentiated this city from other places as a source of civic 
pride, competitive energy and fun for decades. The great collegiate 
association, the Southwest Conference, held its first organizational 
meeting in 1914 at Dallas' Oriental Hotel. The UT-OU tradition started at 
Fair Park in 1929. SMU had a dominating team in the 1930s and 1940s, 
cresting during the Doak Walker era. The Cotton Bowl Classic was one of 
the premiere college bowl games, hosting national championship teams 
through the years.  And, most notably, the Dallas Cowboys are America's 
team. That heritage has been fading for 25 years. Moving the Cowboys 
back to Fair Park would bring in playoff games, reinvigorate the Cotton 
Bowl Classic, save the UT-OU game, attract the Super Bowl to town and 
restore the mystical connection between Dallas and the Cowboys. 
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Building the new stadium in Arlington destroys those traditions for the 
city and weakens the Cowboys as well.169 
 
This letter is of particular importance for two reasons. First, it demonstrates how 
invidious comparison with surrounding cities leads to the perception that a city is 
radiating a negative impression which can only be alleviated through public conspicuous 
consumption on private stadiums. Football is what has “differentiated” the city from the 
surrounding area and is distinct from “other sources of civic pride.” These statements 
demonstrate the second and perhaps most important analytical aspect of the letter in that 
they show how an artifact of popular culture is conceived of as a constitutive historic 
element of a city’s identity. If the goal of the countersubversive in film is to use that 
medium to create a sense of “the real” in accordance with countersubversive goals, it is 
no less true in mobilizing political support in other settings and texts. The feigned 
historiography becomes the basis of judgment on policy issues rather than objective facts 
and costs. 
Despite the impassioned pleas like the one examined above, Dallas rejected 
Jones’ plans, with then-mayor Laura Miller arguing that paying an estimated $350 
million in construction costs was not worth the pricetag compared to other priorities like 
revitalizing downtown Dallas. And while Jones and other pro-stadium forces ridiculed 
Miller, she remained defiant, saying, “Dallas didn’t fumble. Dallas just didn’t want to 
play ball.”170 Miller’s vocal rebuke illustrates one of the key areas for contestation of 
League prerogative—namely the availability of other images and myths to counteract the 
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frame of reality put forth by the League’s countersubversive propaganda. As Delaney and 
Eckstein note, major urban areas like San Diego, with shared cultural histories and 
images that are independent of sports, can often fend off or at least drive harder bargains 
with owners and growth coalitions because they can appeal to other aspects of the city’s 
history as evidence of the city’s importance. They have more ways in which to limit 
invidious comparison than simply tax-payer backed playgrounds for owners and their 
corporate friends.171 
 Nevertheless, if Jones was met with resistance by Irving and Dallas, he had little 
issue when it came to finding willing participants for his project in Arlington, Texas. 
When Dallas couldn’t reach an agreement with Jones, a Cincinnati-style growth coalition 
was waiting with open arms to aid Jones in the construction of his new home. As Dallas 
Morning News reporter Jeff Mosier notes, “Touchdown Arlington!” was led by city 
council member Robert Rivera, himself a former Chairman of the Arlington Convention 
and Visitors Bureau, and the coalition was comprised of the usual suspects of civic and 
business leaders, including Rusty Hancock of Martex Software and Rico Brown, former 
Chairman of the African-American Chamber of Commerce.172 Playing the part of Bob 
Bedinghaus was first-term conservative mayor Robert Cluck, who was said to have 
contacted Jones first about the possibility of moving to the city, although other news 
accounts say the Cowboys were considering about nine to ten locations, including 
Arlington, before Cluck purportedly contacted the team.173 
                                                 
171
 Delaney and Eckstein, 137. 
172
 Jeff Mosier, personal correspondence August 24, 2009. 
173
 Austin. 
 94 
 While Mosier, who covered the stadium story from its beginning, argues that 
the campaign itself was aimed largely at extolling the virtues of economic development 
such a stadium would bring, he also acknowledges that the city has always had identity 
issues relative to its neighbors in the greater Dallas area.  
For a long time, Arlington officials have tried to carve out their own 
identity separate from Dallas and Fort Worth. There have been attempts to 
add an "A" into the DFW moniker that refers to this area…former 
Arlington Mayor Richard Greene had a frequent line about this: 
"Arlington is no one's damn suburb… it's been an underlying current for 
years. Arlington has a larger population than Cincinnati and Pittsburgh, 
but it's still thought of as just another suburb.174 
 
 Mosier’s assessment of Arlington’s identity politics is exemplary of the 
invidious comparison and inferiority complexes that Delaney and Eckstein argue are keys 
to the ability of growth coalitions to manipulate community consciousness and self-
esteem into financing stadium projects. Still, as Mosier notes, despite (or because of) its 
inferiority complex, Arlington was already a major tourist destination, home to the Texas 
Rangers and their publicly-financed park, as well as Six Flags over Texas and the 
Hurricane Harbor water park.175 As noted before, when a city already has “cultural 
perks,”176 it can be difficult to exploit community consciousness without also tying it to 
economic development. This was the course pursued by the “Touchdown Arlington!” 
Campaign. 
The mailers for the pro-stadium campaign reflected this. The first mailing 
included pro-stadium quotes from various former county and city officials touting the 
economic and community self-esteem benefits. In between quotes about “fiscal 
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responsibility” and the need to “invest” in a high-crime area177 were pictures of the 
Cowboys’ Super Bowl trophies, men working in hard hats, and children playing soccer 
with a cut-out of a giant potted flower underneath pasted on the photo. The literal 
centerpiece of the mailing is three connected footballs, respectively reading “2,000 new 
jobs, $2.9 city revenues, and $238 million economic impact.” 178The second mailer opens 
with the message” On November 2, Arlington Voters can Improve a High Crime Area…” 
followed by an image of police tape stating “Crime Scene Do Not Cross.” The next page 
shows pictures of children playing as well as parents and families enjoying outdoor 
sports. Alongside the photos are the identical talking points from the first mailer with one 
noticeable addition—a specific point saying to vote yes in order to “Reduce Crime and 
Protect Families.” The talking point goes on to say that “With Dallas Cowboys Stadium 
and the Cowboys Hall of Fame Museum, we can take a neighborhood suffering from one 
of the highest crime rates in Arlington and turn it into a safe attraction for tourists and 
visitors coming for concerts, family entertainment, and major events like the Super Bowl 
which brought $330 million to Houston.” The mailer ends with the statement “Vote Yes 
on November 2. Let’s Win for Our Economy and Quality of Life.”179 
 The mailers are instructive in that they demonstrate how the elements discussed 
previously: manipulation of community-self esteem and socioeconomic bias in pro-
stadium politics are used, often in tandem with elements of the countersubversive in order 
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to rearrange local loyalties to fit the League and its corporate partners’ agenda. The 
images of construction workers, children and families evoke the paternalistic nostalgia 
that recalls a protective and safe world that is achieved only through the remolding of the 
frontier, in this case by the construction of a stadium. They are juxtaposed against the 
image, symbolized by the police tape, of the omnipresent specter of subversion through 
the criminal element. The images provide a contrast for the desired (paternal protection) 
versus the purported reality (crime).The presented solution to this threat is public 
expenditure in order to entice the wealthier dwellers on the periphery to enter the city and 
spend their leisure time and money there in order to boost economic conditions and wipe 
out the criminal demon. That Jerry Jones himself may profit by as much as $735 million 
from his public-private investment is curiously not called theft.180 
 On October 13, 2000, NBC broadcast the first regular season game from 
Cowboys Stadium on “Sunday Night Football.” While the stadium had been open nearly 
all summer, this was its official debut on the televised stage, and the broadcast—both pre-
game and the game itself, came off as more of an infomercial for the stadium and Jerry 
Jones rather than a focused analysis on the game itself. Pre-game show host Bob Costas 
referred to the stadium as “the Palace in Dallas.” Al Michaels (an outspoken conservative 
broadcaster) said he’d “never been anywhere else in the world like it.” In fact Michaels 
praised Jones’ courage for continuing on with the project in spite of the economic 
downturn, perhaps unaware that Jones was not footing a significant portion of the bill for 
his new home. Interviewing Jones right before kickoff, Costas did note potential issues 
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faced by Jones and his cohorts regarding labor disputes and a potential change in revenue 
structure. In a particularly Reagnesque answer, Jones said it was his job to “grow the pie” 
so that players could concentrate on playing while owners concentrated on “building 
more stadiums.”181 
 The opening to the actual game broadcast started off with successive shots of the 
pyramids, Parthenon, Great Wall of China, Taj Mahal, and the Coliseum. With 
triumphant horns playing in the background, a voice says, “The man-made wonders of 
the world, and now Cowboys Stadium.” Al Michaels then states, “What the Roman 
Coliseum was to the first century, Cowboys Stadium is to the 21st Century. Welcome to 
Jerry World—a sports and entertainment complex that has raised the bar to an entirely 
new level.” Analyst Chris Collinsworth called the stadium, “simply the best.” Shots of 
Rudolph Giuliani in Jones’ owner’s box were shown interwoven with shots of Texas 
armed forces members waving a field-long U.S. flag during the national anthem. The 
ceremonial coin toss was performed by former President George W. Bush, the last man to 
bilk Arlington out of public money for the Rangers’ ballpark nearly two decades ago. 
Nearly every commercial break in the game started with a shot of Jones conversing with 
Bush, Giuliani and other people of historical importance to the Cowboys’ organization as 
well as the average fans whose seats surround the owner’s box with an almost panoptic 
quality.  Not once during the broadcast was it mentioned that “Jerry World” had been 
built partially with public funds or that it was facing numerous cost overruns that would 
hurt the city which had financed it.182 Rather, the focus was on the building as a 
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representation of a particular man (Jones) and his pecuniary tastes and beliefs in 
corporate capitalism as evidenced by the neoliberal political company around him. That 
the political figures are presented as supplicants to Jones’ hospitality not only speaks to 
the previously mentioned concept that the man of leisure is looking for witnesses to his 
excess, but also demonstrates how the League and the networks who broadcast games 
celebrate and normalize the pecuniary reputability of Jones under what Veblen calls “the 
propaganda of culture.” 
The propaganda of culture is in great part an inculcation of new tastes, or rather a 
new schedule of proprieties, which have been adapted to the upper class scheme 
of life under the guidance of the leisure-class formulation of status and pecuniary 
decency. This new schedule of proprieties is intruded into the lower-class scheme 
of life from the code elaborated by an element of the population whose life lies 
outside of the industrial process…the economic reform wrought [from changes in 
the propaganda of culture] is largely of the nature of a permutation in the methods 
of conspicuous waste.183 
  
Evidence of the propaganda of culture is seen in “Sunday Night Football” not 
only through the presentation of Jones as an archetypal man of leisure but also through 
the presentation of the building itself. Whereas monuments like the Taj Mahal and Great 
Wall are shown as “first century” relics, predicated on religious or defensive power, 
Cowboys’ Stadium is the embodiment of the proprieties of the 21st century—surveillance 
(as evidenced by the owner’s box being situated in between standard fan seats), 
neoliberalism (as evidenced by the fixation on the presence of Bush and Giuliani), and 
imperial nationalism, as evidenced by the massive flag and military participation in the 
event’s opening. 
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 The stadium issue demonstrates not only the real policy inducements (public 
money for private enterprise) that motivate the League but also one point of contestation 
the League is up against. As the case of Dallas rejecting a homecoming for the Cowboys 
shows, even in a political reality which generally is supportive of League and corporate 
prerogatives, political actors can rely on other sources of political or social capital to 
defeat these prerogatives. Nowhere has this been historically more evident than with the 
relationship between the League and its players’ union. 
Labor Battles Then and Now 
 While the cultural politics of urban areas have at times been an important 
counterpoint to NFL prerogatives and a rebuke of NFL propaganda, they in many ways 
pale in comparison to the historical contestation put forth by the players’ themselves in 
the form of labor disputes that first centered around gaining the right to organize and are 
now focused on being able to protect and expand on the labor freedoms that the League 
often reluctantly granted because of those struggles. 
 In Brand NFL, Michael Oriard provides arguably the most complete history of the 
drive to organize the players into a legitimate union—a struggle which would last nearly 
three decades, would create multiple work stoppages, and would ultimately be decided by 
federal courts rather than picket lines. In fact, the NFL Players’ Association (NFLPA) 
was in many ways the result of a Supreme Court case—Radovich v. NFL (1957) which, 
at the time, subjected the NFL to anti-trust law (a move which, as previously noted, was 
later nullified by the Kennedy Administration and Congress). Conservative leadership 
relegated the union to little more than a grievance committee rather than a genuine 
collective bargaining unit, but nonetheless gave players some tangible benefits including 
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a minimum salary and injury compensation. More importantly, it set the foundation for 
future labor challenges by slightly more progressive union leaders.184 
 The first large-scale, player-driven drive for labor freedom in the NFL began with 
the 1974 strike, which occurred just three years after the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) recognized the NFLPA as a legitimate collective bargaining unit. The initial 
contract issues centered around a list of 63 demands which dealt nominally with salary 
increases and the impact of Astroturf on players’ safety, but were, as Oriard notes, most 
specifically geared at attacking what the players saw as issues of basic freedom in regard 
to treatment by management and coaches as it concerned curfews, fines and most 
importantly, the right to free agency. 
The ‘anarchic’ freedoms demanded in 1974 are the basic rights enjoyed by every 
player in the NFL today, but the strike of 1974 marked the beginning of a slow-
motion revolution that took two decades to play out. The modern NFL was built 
on two fundamental ‘anti-freedoms’: the players’ lack of freedom to move from 
team to team and the owners’ lack of freedom to move from city to city. The 
Oakland Raider’s Al Davis would win freedom for owners in a three-year legal 
battle with the NFL in the early 1980s…the players would not win theirs until 
1993.185 
  
The strike, which would begin in July of 1974 with a public picket in San Diego 
where players sported signs with radical slogans like, “Monopoly is Played with Dice” 
and, “People are Players, not Property,” ended by September with the union defeated 
both through a lack of solidarity among star players and other veterans as well as a 
concerted propaganda push by the owners, represented through a Management Council, 
to portray the players as greedy and ignorant of economic facts regarding the League’s 
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operations. Interestingly, Oriard imputes a great deal of the failure of the 1974 strike to 
the media in NFL team towns, who stressed the “rugged individualism” of American life 
over “the social compact” ideal of the team sport and portrayed NFL teams as 
“Darwinian Jungles” rather than families.186 The strike also showed the more repressive 
side of the NFL, as clubs cut most of the players associated with the union, including 
future coaching legend Bill Curry.187 
 Players made a second push for labor freedom in 1982, just as the NFL was 
reaching the beginning of its pinnacle as America’s favorite sport. It was preceded by a 
landmark NLRB ruling  that the NFL had engaged in unfair labor practices during the 
1974 strike and court decisions which found basic tenets of the NFL’s economic 
system—the college draft and restricted free agency, in violation of antitrust law unless 
they were agreed to under collective bargaining. 188  Presumably armed with the law 
behind them, players and their union leader Ed Garvey struck during the regular season in 
1982 (another first) in order to push forward a management model for the League that 
made the NFLPA a full partner in the management and operation of the NFL. Owners, 
unwilling to cede operational control of the League to any degree, cancelled the season. 
As with the previous strike, a lack of labor solidarity between star players such as Joe 
Montana and Terry Bradshaw also contributed greatly to any effective public 
mobilization for a labor action.189 The strike failed, but legal victories and increases in 
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player salaries (driven in part by competition from the now-defunct USFL) made free 
agency a real possibility for future negotiations. 
 The final and most successful drive for labor freedom began in 1987 when new 
NFLPA head Gene Upshaw called for a regular season strike with free agency as a 
primary demand. The 24-day strike ended up far more successfully than the previous 
ones for a couple of reasons: first, labor solidarity was higher as even high profile players 
such as Jim Kelly and John Elway sat out the start of the season (though the NFL’s 
biggest star, Joe Montana, again did not). Secondly, in contrast to their actions in the last 
strike, NFL’s owners decided to play the season anyway with scab or “replacement” 
players—a move which turned fans and the press decidedly against the League. As 
Oriard notes, the general attitude in 1987 “seemed to be that owners were doing what 
owners do: make lots of money, bust unions, and profess concern for ‘the integrity of the 
game’ while dumping a fraudulent version of the NFL on a gullible public.” Still, with a 
television monopoly on pro football broadcasts at the time, scab games delivered enough 
ratings that the strike itself was fruitless in terms of immediate gains.190 However, it did 
give the union enough time to file labor suits against the NFL entitled Powell v. NFL and 
McNeil v. NFL. Victory in the latter case (and the temporary decertifying of the union as 
a bargaining agent) would force the NFL into a managed partnership with the NFLPA 
that was ratified in 1993. The deal guaranteed free agency as well as a percentage of 
television revenue sharing for players, and saw the League achieve its longest labor peace 
since the 1950s. 
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The Current Controversies 
 With the current collective bargaining agreement that has given the NFL its labor 
peace and commercial longevity set to expire with the 2011 season, a new activism has 
emerged among the NFLPA and its players both in terms of expanding labor freedom and 
creating greater transparency in the conducting of League financial affairs. It began in 
earnest with the passing of former longtime NFLPA director Gene Upshaw in 2008 and 
the subsequent appointment of DeMaurice Smith, a corporate attorney and political ally 
of President Obama191 in March 2009. What makes Smith’s appointment particularly 
interesting is that he is the first NFLPA Executive Director to have no previous ties to the 
NFL in a coaching, management, union, or player capacity. The appointment, which 
came as surprise to analysts, may be in part due to the issues surrounding the next 
bargaining agreement, which present one of the biggest challenges to the League’s 
financial operations to date as it concerns transparency and revenue sharing.  
 In July 2009, Smith and a handful of NFL player representatives met with liberal 
Democratic leadership in Congress in a push to lobby lawmakers to reconsider the 
League’s anti-trust exemption status as well as its bookkeeping practices. The push came 
after a League Management Council proposal (made public by the union) demanded that 
players accept a 20 percent football revenue sharing reduction in the next collective 
bargaining agreement. 192The League claimed such a reduction is necessary to offset 
losses in profit, a claim the union and others find dubious given the League’s continued 
                                                 
191
 Jeffery Lord, “Who is DeMaurice Smith?” The American Spectator Online, October 15, 2009. 
192
 Leaders meet with top lawmakers” Associated Press, July 15, 2009 
 104 
boost in ratings.193 Moreover, a union commissioned study found that the average value 
of the teams has grown from $288 million to $1.04 billion over 10 years, an increase of 
about 14 percent a year, severely undermining the League’s claims and providing the 
basis for a legal reconsideration of the League’s accounting practices and anti-trust 
protections194. 
 Other indicators that the NFLPA intends to take a more militant line include the 
shoring up of star power behind union prerogatives, with marquee quarterbacks Tom 
Brady and Drew Brees both becoming player representatives in 2009. Such an early 
commitment of solidarity provides a marked contrast to what reporter Ron Borges calls 
the “shameful” practice of star players of previous eras snubbing union efforts.195 Still the 
largest signs that the players’ are willing to take a prolonged stand on the revenue pay cut 
come from the militant tone of Smith himself, who has called the upcoming fight “a 
 battle of owners against players, and, I believe, against fans.” 
When you negotiate with the networks, when the owners get the monies from the 
networks even if the games aren't played, is it really a battle of billionaires against 
millionaires? Or is it a battle between owners on one side and the people who play 
and the people who watch…our fans identify with that. They understand punching 
a clock every day. My hope is that sooner rather than later we get to the point 
where we can jointly announce at least to our fans that the one thing we don't 
have to worry about is football going away.''196 
  
By framing the issue in populist rhetoric, Smith is clearly trying to position the 
CBA negotiations as a progressive fight for the preservation of not only the game but the 
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blue collar mentality that surrounds it. In doing so, he, and the players he speaks for, look 
less like cattle in the pastoral pens the League likes to display in its propaganda and more 
like human beings, a significant challenge to the League’s self-image and policy agenda. 
Conclusion: When Countersubversion Meets Political Reality 
 Writing about the larger historical and political impact of Birth of a Nation, Rogin 
argues that the film’s ultimate success as a political document rested in its ability to tap 
collective fantasies that created a “conviction of truth beyond history.” In a political 
world shaped by contingencies and conflicting interpretations, the aim of D.W. Griffith’s 
work was to “abolish interpretation” and to make the film not merely “an avenue to 
history but its replacement.”197 
 The NFL, through the countersubversive discourse in its filmography, particularly 
its emphasis on militarized unity and a pastoral organizational structure, attempts to do 
what Griffith sought out to do a century ago—put a utopian gloss over a political world 
(and sport) where interpretations of events are not necessarily linear. The 
countersubversive practitioner is attempting to replace a world where other shared 
cultural dynamics (in the case of stadiums, community identities, and in the case of 
players, their roles as laborers under a restrictive system) may undermine the policy 
agenda the League desires. From the cases studied here, it appears that insofar as the 
League is successful, it is only when there is a lack of shared cultural identity (as with 
stadium construction) or relative peace in its relations to its players, which is now 
eroding. At the same time, the success of contesting forces will likely also depend on 
whether their capacity to mobilize their interpretations (e.g. billionaire owners vs. fans) 
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of events is captivating enough to convince others that the NFL utopia is unworthy of 
their support. How these issues will continue to play out will likely have as much or more 
to do with external forces (economic recession, infrastructure decay, etc.) than any of the 
participants may realize.
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CONCLUSION 
THE NFL, PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL TRADITION 
“Practices attributed to the subversive actually depict countersubversive aspirations; the 
more powerful the demonology, therefore, the more it speaks, against itself, truths about 
American politics.” - Michael Rogin198 
 
“They are the ones with prejudice and bigotry coursing through their vanes [sic], 
through their hearts, and through their souls. They are consumed with jealousy and rage. 
They are all liberals--and make no mistake: That's what this is about…These people are 
scum.” 
- Rush Limbaugh, after being rejected in his bid to own the St. 
Louis Rams199 
 
In doing this study I had two main goals. One was to show how the NFL—
through its NFL Films-produced filmography as well as in its broadcast material and 
stadium campaigns, works as a propaganda engine for values associated with the 
countersubversive tradition—namely fascination with violence and valuation of 
hierarchical order. In the former case, the NFL acts as sort of proxy battleground in times 
of military mobilization where the public can partake in the military spectacle without 
having to actually bear witness to combat. Moreover, NFL films normalize violence as an 
inevitable trait of everyday existence, reinforcing a Hobbesian view of human nature that 
cries out for a National Security State to be erected and celebrated for its ability to protect 
the country from boundary invasion by demons.  
In the case of valuation of hierarchical order, I showed how NFL films normalize 
the corporate, paternal organization by connecting the corporate form and the actors 
within it to earlier notions in American pop culture about surveillance-oriented pastoral 
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heroism (embodied in owners, executives, and coaches) and the taming of the wilderness 
and its savages (embodied by the players). Lastly, I showed how the NFL uses other 
strategies along with countersubversion to promote policy goals, such as evoking 
invidious comparison in communities in order to extract public subsidies for their private 
stadiums. By preying on community self-esteem, the NFL and corporate growth 
coalitions exploit the lived identities of people within an urban area by connecting them 
to the team’s private profits. In noting this, I demonstrated how the NFL has genuine 
political-economic incentive to propagandize the countersubversive agenda. Whether its 
stadium deals, anti-trust protections, or lucrative partnerships with the Department of 
Defense, the promulgation of the countersubversive agenda leads to a climate that 
produces lucrative profit opportunities for the NFL as well as the maintenance of a 
political atmosphere in which the prerogatives and privileges of those who own the 
League will be seldom challenged as they are taken for granted as business as usual. At 
the same time, this promulgation of countersubversion is not as hegemonic as the NFL 
would like—as stadium defeats and labor strife indicate. 
It is this latter point that speaks to the second goal of this study, namely to bring 
to the fore how elements of popular culture like the NFL and their relationship to the 
countersubversive value system help constitute a significant part of the American 
political tradition and why it is important for political science to acknowledge this 
relationship. As I noted in my introduction, the scholarship surrounding the American 
political tradition has offered numerous explanations as to what the American tradition is 
(liberalism, republicanism, etc.) without explaining why the values that create a tradition 
gain such traction within mass society over an extended period of time. 
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 If, as E.E. Schattschneider once put it, “the definition of alternatives is the 
supreme instrument of power,”200 it becomes particularly important for stakeholders of 
the status quo to have a tool like propaganda—particularly countersubversive 
propaganda, with its emphasis on external and internal monsters, fear of boundary 
invasion, and subordination to hierarchical order to rely on in order to restrict political 
alternatives to the maintenance of a comparatively conservative ideology even (or 
especially) in times where the status quo might otherwise be questioned.  
As Rogin argues, this is particularly necessary in a purported liberal polity like the 
United States where the “divided vocabulary of competition and self-interest” runs up 
against the vocabulary “of community and self.” Rather than acknowledge the 
contradictions between individualism and nationalism outright, countersubversive 
propaganda attempts to heal the split by avoiding its sources in society by creating unity 
through the split of the countersubversive and his foe.201 Rogin saw mass texts, 
particularly film, as the most important propaganda vehicle for the propagation of 
countersubversive values because they not only made political demonology visible in 
widely popular and influential forms but because they also had a power that was normally 
denied the word alone—they show us what we are talking about in our everyday 
discourse. In doing so they speak to a fundamental impulse to ingest historical, physical, 
and personal experience—they present the image as the reality202 and provide a reference 
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point by which we can reassure ourselves of the validity of our own fears and fantasies 
while being assured we are also protected from them. 
This is not to deny that challenges to the status quo and contestation over 
meanings do not break through into dominant countersubversive discourse at times. 
Indeed, as evidenced by stadium and labor issues, the NFL itself has been a place where, 
despite its rigid hierarchical system, players have at times been able to at least moderately 
reframe the substance of the debate about what the game is and its meaning in American 
life. The first significant case of this was former St. Louis Cardinals lineman Dave 
Meggyesy’s startling departure from the game at the top of his career to write the exposé 
Out of Their League, which showed the rampant racism behind the early days of the 
game that reads as if it’s part of the countersubversive tradition scholarship itself. 
Black ball players are selected even more stringently on the basis of “correct 
attitudes than whites. Blacks are in an especially difficult position; if they act like 
Toms, they will be completely dominated by the white ball players and lose 
respect for themselves and each other. But if they are too “militant” and try to 
assert their basic manhood by attempting to break out of the whites’ stereotype of 
the dumb, insensitive jock, they are immediately under suspicion and often cut 
from the squad,203 
 
Meggyesy’s recount of the racism and paranoia of “militancy” can easily be seen 
as the countersubversive fear of internal subversion of foreign elements into an 
established culture and ideology. When released, the book shed a public light on the dark 
underbelly of the League and contributed to a (slight) reimagining of race relations in the 
pro football. Moreover, the early battle for a genuine union during Meggyesy and 
Oriard’s time eventually led to the legal cases that granted players a significant place at 
the NFL’s economic table. More recent examples include Steelers’ linebacker James’ 
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Harrison’s declining to visit President Obama at the White House,204 perhaps indicating 
an indifference to the sovereign in juxtaposition to official NFL filmography. 
 Of all the most current examples none is perhaps more exemplary of direct 
contestation against countersubversive propagandizing itself than the League’s rejection 
of a potential bid by Rush Limbaugh to be a minority partner in a potential sale of the St. 
Louis Rams. When Limbaugh who,as previously mentioned was once fired as an NFL 
analyst on ESPN for racist remarks about Donovan McNabb, was announced as part of a 
bidding group for minority ownership in the Rams, black player outrage was pointedly 
critical. New York Giant Mathias Kiwanuka told the New York Daily News, "I don't 
want anything to do with a team that he has any part of. He can do whatever he wants; it 
is a free country. But if it goes through, I can tell you where I am not going to play.” New 
York Jets linebacker Bart Scott said, "I can only imagine how his players would feel.... 
He could offer me whatever he wanted; I wouldn't play for him."205 Such outright refusal 
to potentially play under one of America’s premier demonologists (a man who once 
claimed that watching the NFL was like watching “a game between the Bloods and the 
Crips without any weapons”)206 undoubtedly put pressure on otherwise conservative 
owners to publicly denounce a Limbaugh ownership bid, with even Commissioner Roger 
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Goodell saying Limbaugh’s history of “divisive” comments would not be tolerated in the 
League proper.207 
These examples suggest, albeit anecdotally, that pre-existing ideologies, built up 
from lived experience (like the life of a black player in a conservative sport) provide the 
ground for contestation of countersubversive propaganda by providing alternative 
reference points to its meanings. Still, such challenges run up against the overwhelming 
resources, conservative political connections,208 and near-monopoly on the NFL ‘brand’ 
the League has on its presentation in image mediums like television and film. And 
despite an uncertain labor situation in 2011 and a poor economy, the NFL continues to 
see success in television ratings and revenues—both are up over 10 percent from last 
year,209 meaning they still have the overwhelming economic edge in terms of getting their 
propaganda out to the mass public. 
What this study demonstrates is not only how the countersubversive tradition is 
presented today in a particular form of popular culture but also how it influences the 
definition of political alternatives that constitutes American politics. As John Fiske once 
said, television cannot create reality, but it can reinforce the dominant sense of reality.210 
It’s time to acknowledge this and perhaps trade in the hue of the Hartzian amber of liberal 
tradition scholarship for the glow of the Sunday afternoon television broadcast. 
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